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THE NATURE OF FAMILY, THE FAMILY OF NATURE: THE 
SURPRISING LIBERAL DEFENSE OF THE TRADITIONAL 
FAMILY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
John Witte, Jr.* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article shows that many Enlightenment liberals defended traditional 
family values and warned against the dangers of sexual libertinism and marital 
breakdown. While they rejected many traditional teachings in their 
construction of modern liberalism, Enlightenment liberals held firmly to 
classical and Christian teachings that exclusive and enduring monogamous 
marriages are the best way to ensure paternal certainty and joint parental 
investment in children who are born vulnerable and dependent on their 
parents’ mutual care. Stable marital households, furthermore, are the best way 
to ensure that men and women are treated with equal dignity and respect, and 
that husbands and wives, and parents and children, provide each other with 
mutual support, protection, and edification throughout their lifetimes. The 
positive law of the state must not only support the marital family but also 
outlaw polygamy, fornication, adultery, and “light divorce” that violate the 
other spouse’s natural rights as well as desertion, abuse, neglect, and 
disinheritance that violate their children’s natural rights to support, 
protection, and education from their parents. This argument about the natural 
norms and laws of sex, marriage, and family life, was adumbrated by Aristotle, 
elaborated by Thomas Aquinas, and then extended by scores of later 
theologians, philosophers, and jurists. Many of the great architects of Western 
liberalism embraced these traditional teachings and defended them with 
arguments from nature, reason, custom, fairness, prudence, utility, 
pragmatism, and common sense. Their arguments echoed loudly in sundry 
Anglo-American common law texts, statutes, and cases until the twentieth 
century, and they remain instructive even for our post-modern polities and 
families. 
 
 * Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion; Alonzo L. McDonald Distinguished 
Professor; and Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory University. I am deeply grateful to Elliott Foote, 
Andy Mayo, and Justin Latterell for their excellent research assistance, Amy Wheeler for her expert 
administrative help, and Elizabeth Christian and Kelly Parker Cobb for their fine library services. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For better or worse, we are in the midst of a family law revolution that is 
upending millennium-long laws and customs of the West.1 A century ago, 
American law defined marriage as an exclusive and enduring monogamous 
union between a man and a woman with the freedom and capacity to marry 
each other.2 Marriage was considered to be the heart of the family and 
household, and it was designed for the mutual love and support of husband and 
wife, their mutual protection from sexual temptation, and their mutual 
procreation, nurture, and education of children. The law required that 
engagements be formal and that marriages be contracted with parental consent 
and witnesses and with a suitable waiting period, sometimes accompanied by 
the publication of banns. It required marriage licenses and registration and 
solemnization before civil authorities, religious authorities, or both. It 
prohibited marriages between couples with various blood and kin ties 
identified in the Mosaic and Roman law. It discouraged marriage where one 
party was impotent or had a contagious disease that precluded sex and 
procreation or physically endangered the other spouse. Couples who sought to 
divorce had to publicize their intentions, to petition a court, to show adequate 
cause or fault, and to make provision for the dependent spouse and children. 
Criminal laws outlawed fornication, adultery, prostitution, sodomy, polygamy, 
incest, contraception, abortion, and other perceived sexual offenses. Tort laws 
held third parties liable for seduction, enticement, loss of consortium, or 
alienation of the affections of one’s spouse. Many of these legal rules had 
millennium-long roots in the civil law, canon law, and common law traditions 
of the West, with several rules going deeper still into ancient Greek and 
Roman laws.3 
 
 1 This Article is part and product of ongoing work on the history of law, religion, and family. It draws in 
part from JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE 
WESTERN TRADITION (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT]; JOHN WITTE, JR., GOD’S JOUST, 
GOD’S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (2006) [hereinafter WITTE, GOD’S JOUST]; 
JOHN WITTE, JR., THE SINS OF THE FATHERS: THE LAW AND THEOLOGY OF ILLEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED 
(2009) [hereinafter WITTE, SINS]; and JOHN WITTE, JR., WHY TWO IN ONE FLESH: THE WESTERN CASE FOR 
MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter, WITTE, POLYGAMY]. ©John Witte, Jr. 
 2 For the propositions of this paragraph, see the detailed sources in WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra 
note 1, at 287–324; WITTE, GOD’S JOUST, supra note 1, at 295–449. For a compilation of relevant American 
statutes and cases, broken down by legal topic, see CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS. For an 
overview of English common law developments, see A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW, 1857–1957 (R.H. Graveson 
& F.R. Crane eds., 1957). For authoritative summaries of prevailing American family law at the turn of the 
twentieth century, see sources cited infra notes 575–80.  
 3 See sources in WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra note 1, at 17–112; WITTE, SINS supra note 1, 11–104; 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD: MARRYING AND ITS DOCUMENTATION IN WESTERN CHRISTENDOM, 400–1600 (Philip 
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Today, much of this traditional family law has fallen or been pushed aside 
in favor of new cultural and constitutional norms of sexual liberty, privacy, and 
autonomy.4 Marriage is viewed increasingly at law and at large today as a 
private contract to be formed, maintained, and dissolved as the parties see fit. 
Requirements of parental consent and witnesses to the formation of 
engagement and marital contracts have largely disappeared. Mandatory waiting 
periods between engagement and marriage have also largely disappeared. 
Unilateral no-fault divorce statutes have reduced the divorce proceeding to an 
expensive formality in most states. Payments of alimony and other forms of 
post-marital support to dependent spouses and children have given way to 
lump-sum property exchanges providing a clean break for parties to remarry. 
Court-supervised property settlements between divorcing spouses have largely 
given way to privately negotiated or mediated settlements often confirmed 
with little scrutiny by courts. Many states now offer off-the-rack models of 
straight and same-sex marriage, civil union, and domestic partnership with 
shrinking functional distinctions between them. Privacy laws protect all 
manner of other voluntary sexual conduct and relationships among adults, and 
rapidly growing portions of the population are no longer bothering with formal 
marriage, especially those with fewer means and less education. Free speech 
laws protect all manner of sexual expression, short of obscenity and child 
pornography. The classic sex crimes of incest, prostitution, and polygamy 
remain on the books, but they are now the subjects of emerging cultural and 
constitutional battles.5 The formal legal categories of marriage and family also 
 
L. Reynolds & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2007). The best single volume overview remains JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, 
LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1987). 
 4 For the propositions of this paragraph, see the detailed sources in WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra 
note 1, at 331–59; FAMILY TRANSFORMED: RELIGION, VALUES, AND SOCIETY IN AMERICAN LIFE (Steven M. 
Tipton & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2005). For good overviews of current Anglo-American family law from 
different perspectives, see ANN LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2013); 
WHAT IS PARENTHOOD: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY (Linda C. McClain & Dan Cere eds., 
2013); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(2002); RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006). For a series of excellent annual social science 
studies of the changing patterns of marriage and family in the United States, see Marriage, INST. ON AM. 
VALUES, http://www.americanvalues.org/marriage (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); Research and Analysis on 
Health of Marriage and Family in America, NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, http://nationalmarriageproject.org 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
 5 See, e.g., ANGELA CAMPBELL, SISTER WIVES, SURROGATES AND SEX WORKERS: OUTLAWS BY 
CHOICE? (2013); Note, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow of the “Sexual Family,” 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2006). For further sources, see MARK GOLDFEDER, LEGALIZING PLURAL MARRIAGE: 
THE NEXT FRONTIER IN FAMILY LAW (forthcoming 2015); WITTE, POLYGAMY, supra note 1. 
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still remain on the books, but leading scholars are now pressing for their 
“disestablishment,” if not outright “abolition.”6 
These exponential changes in modern Anglo-American family laws have 
been, in no small part, valiant efforts to bring greater freedom and equality to 
American public and private life and to purge the law of its many centuries of 
patriarchy, paternalism, and plain prudishness. They are also basic legal 
adaptations to the exponential changes that have occurred in the culture and 
condition of modern families: the stunning advances in reproductive and 
medical technology; the exposure to vastly different perceptions of sexuality, 
kinship, and family structure born of globalization; the growing relaxation and 
diversification of norms and habits of sexual expression now greatly enhanced 
by the internet and other media; the explosion of international and domestic 
norms of human rights and freedom; and the implosion of the Ozzie and 
Harriet family born of new economic and professional demands on wives, 
husbands, and children, and much more.7 
But all these changes in the culture and law of the family have introduced a 
number of striking new separations in the sexual field—separations between 
marriage and sex, between marriage and childbirth, between marriage and 
child rearing, between childbirth and parenting, between sex and physical 
contact (with the advent of the virtual world), and between childbirth, sexual 
intercourse, and biological filiation (with the introduction of IVF technology, 
surrogacy, and sperm banks).8 Historically, the Western legal tradition 
promoted the integration of marriage, sexual intercourse, childbirth, and child 
rearing within a sturdy family framework to best satisfy the natural rights and 
needs of men, women, and children alike.9 Not so much now. As Chief Rabbi 
Jonathan Sacks of the United Kingdom has written, the world of sex has 
become “a value-free zone.”10 
 
 6 See the collection of perspectives in ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, 
MORALITY, AND THE LAW (2012); MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (Anita Bernstein 
ed., 2006); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER 
THE LAW (2008); and Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236 
(2010). 
 7 See sources cited supra note 3; see also DON S. BROWNING, MARRIAGE AND MODERNIZATION: HOW 
GLOBALIZATION THREATENS MARRIAGE AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2003). 
 8 DON S. BROWNING, Family Law and Christian Jurisprudence, in CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION 163, 165–68 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2008). See more fully BROWNING, 
supra note 7, at 1–29, 211–44.  
 9 See WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra note 1, 53–287; see also BROWNING, supra note 7, at 55–128. 
 10 JONATHAN SACKS, THE HOME WE BUILD TOGETHER: RECREATING SOCIETY 210 (2007). 
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Whatever happens between two consenting adults in private is, most 
people now believe, entirely a matter for them. The law may not 
intervene; neither may social sanction. It is simply not other people’s 
business. 
Together with a whole series of other changes, the result has 
been that what marriage brought together has now split apart. There 
has been a divorce between sex and love, love and marriage, 
marriage and reproduction, reproduction and education and nurture. 
Sex is for pleasure. Love is a feeling, not a commitment. Marriage is 
now deeply unfashionable. Nurture has been outsourced to 
specialized child carers. Education is the responsibility of the state. 
And the consequences of failure are delegated to social workers.11 
It is no surprise to hear a distinguished rabbi—or a distinguished bishop, 
imam, or priest—lament some of the excesses of the modern sexual revolution, 
though there are plenty of religious leaders who champion these modern 
reforms.12 It is also no surprise to hear conservative scholars, judges, 
commentators, and policy makers note with alarm the formidable 
psychological, social, and economic costs of the modern sexual revolution. 
Indeed, these critics have converted their energies into a new “marriage 
movement” in America over the past two decades, seeking to counter some of 
the perceived excesses and dangers of the modern sexual revolution.13 
It will come as more of a surprise, at least for some readers,14 to hear strong 
historical liberals issue stern warnings about the dangers of many of the very 
family law reforms that America and other Western lands have been making. 
But strong warnings are just what we hear in the writings of a long series of 
 
 11 Id. 
 12 See, e.g., GENE ROBINSON, GOD BELIEVES IN LOVE: STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT GAY MARRIAGE (2012). 
 13 The Institute for American Values and the National Marriage Project are current leaders of this 
movement. See supra note 4. The late Don Browning at the University of Chicago led a major series of 
ground-breaking projects on “Religion, Culture, and Family” in the 1990s and early 2000s, which he compiled 
into a summary volume. See DON S. BROWNING ET AL., FROM CULTURE WARS TO COMMON GROUND: 
RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY DEBATE (2d ed. 2000).  
 14 It was a surprise to me at least and forced me to correct the too narrow and too negative view of 
Enlightenment theories of marriage in my first edition of FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, 
RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1997), where I presented John Stuart Mill as the 
representative voice of Enlightenment liberalism. Id. at 200–02. On fuller and deeper reading since then, I now 
realize that Mill’s teachings on sex, marriage, and family are, in fact, a rather liberal anomaly of liberalism 
before the twentieth century. I regret this mischaracterization and offer this Article as a partial corrective to my 
youthful ignorance. For better analysis of the development of liberal thought on the family from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, see BRENT WATERS, THE FAMILY IN CHRISTIAN SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL THOUGHT (2007); and SCOTT YENOR, FAMILY POLITICS: THE IDEA OF MARRIAGE IN MODERN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT (2011). 
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leading Enlightenment liberals in continental Europe, England, Scotland, and 
America.15 For all of their antiestablishment and sometimes antireligious 
crusades on so many fronts, these Enlightenment liberals supported the 
traditional natural configuration of sex, marriage, and family life and the 
traditional body of family laws that accompanied it. The honor roll of such 
Enlightenment writers included Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, Jean 
Barbeyrac, John Locke, Mary Wollstonecraft, Baron Montesquieu, François 
Voltaire, David Hume, Henry Home, Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Jeremy 
Bentham, William Blackstone, William Paley, Thomas Jefferson, Joseph 
Story, James Kent, and scores of other philosophers and jurists writing from 
roughly 1600 to 1900. Most of these figures were sharp critics of Christian 
establishments and sometimes of Christian theology altogether—although a 
number of them still identified themselves as Christians. Many of them were 
free thinkers who regularly rattled and rankled the intellectual and legal status 
quo. Many of them were major architects of modern liberalism, and its 
signature teachings of personal liberty, human rights, social equality, 
democratic government, constitutional order, and rule of law. Nonetheless, 
almost all of these Enlightenment liberals embraced most of the traditional 
forms and norms of sex, marriage, and family life. And they called for the 
continued integration of marriage, sexual intercourse, childbirth, and child 
rearing within the family as the best way to protect the personal liberty and 
natural rights of men, women, and children and to cultivate the health, safety, 
and welfare of the community. Rather than citing the Bible and theology, 
however, or simply relying on earlier classical and Christian arguments to 
support their theory and law of the family, these Enlightenment writers offered 
a whole series of interesting arguments from human nature, natural law, natural 
rights, and natural fairness as well as arguments from utility, economics, 
comparative anthropology, evolutionary biology, and plain common sense. 
Their basic argument was that exclusive and enduring monogamous 
marriages are the best way to ensure paternal certainty and joint parental 
investment in children who are born vulnerable and utterly dependent on their 
 
 15 I am using the term “Enlightenment liberal(ism)” rather conventionally to describe the series of 
intellectual movements from the mid-sixteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century in continental Europe, 
England, Scotland, and America that helped bring legal, political, and social transformation, in part on the 
strength of new ideas of rationalism, contractualism, individualism, pluralism, and more. Among many 
accounts, see for example, ERNST CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Fritz C.A. Koelln & 
James P. Pettegrove trans., 1951); PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION (1966); ARTHUR 
HERMAN, THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: THE SCOTS’ INVENTION OF THE MODERN WORLD (2001); HENRY F. 
MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976). 
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parents’ mutual care.16 Exclusive and enduring monogamous marriages, 
furthermore, are the best way to ensure that men and women are treated with 
equal dignity and respect, and that husbands and wives, and parents and 
children, provide each other with mutual support, protection, and edification 
throughout their lifetimes.17 The positive law of the state must not only support 
such marriages, the argument continued; it must also outlaw polygamy, 
fornication, adultery, and easy divorce that violate the other spouse’s natural 
rights as well as desertion, abuse, neglect, and disinheritance that violate their 
children’s natural rights to support, protection, and education. 
This argument about the most natural and expedient configuration of 
marriage and the family norms drew on complex and evolving ideas 
concerning human infant dependency, parental bonding, paternal certainty and 
investment, and the natural rights and duties of husband and wives, and parents 
and children. But it started with three brute realities about human nature and 
sexual reproduction that every family law system had to address: that human 
adults crave sex a good deal of the time, that human children need help for a 
very long time, and that human beings, unlike all other animals, are capable of 
self-destructive and species-destructive sexual behavior that society needs 
somehow to deter in the interests of private and public health, safety, and 
welfare. 
The basic outline of this argument about the natural configuration of 
marriage and the family was sketched already half a millennium before the 
Enlightenment by the brilliant Dominican friar, Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’ 
argument, in turn, became a staple of the thought of neo-Thomist Dominican 
scholars gathered at the University of Salamanca in Spain, notably Francisco 
Vitoria who was a major source of inspiration and instruction for later 
Enlightenment writers. Early Enlightenment figures, like Hugo Grotius and 
John Locke, took these (neo-)Thomistic arguments about marriage and the 
family as the starting point for their more expansive liberal theory of the family 
that generations of later Enlightenment philosophers and jurists echoed and 
elaborated. Their views, in turn, penetrated deeply into the Anglo-American 
common laws of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, courtesy especially of 
William Blackstone and Joseph Story, who were avid readers of the 
Enlightenment philosophers. This Article tells that story and then returns in the 
Conclusions to some of the implications of that story for our day. 
 
 16 See infra Part V.A (discussing Henry Home).  
 17 See WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra note 1, at 279–81 (discussing John Locke). 
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I. THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN CLASSICAL AND 
CHRISTIAN THOUGHT 
A. Background 
It was a commonplace of the Western tradition to speak of the “nature” of 
marriage and the family—its natural form and function, its natural goods and 
goals, its natural rights and duties that attach to husband and wife, and parent 
and child. The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–321 B.C.E.), for example, 
viewed monogamous marriage as the natural foundation of the polis.18 He 
envisioned humans as political or communal animals who form states and 
other associations “for the purpose of attaining some good.”19 “[E]very state is 
composed of households,” Aristotle wrote famously in his Politics.20 Every 
household, in turn, is composed of a “pairing of those who cannot exist without 
one another. Male and female must unite for the reproduction of the species—
not from deliberate intention, but from the natural impulse . . . to leave behind 
them something of the same nature as themselves.”21 
Aristotle extended this view in his Ethics, now emphasizing the natural 
inclinations and goods of dyadic marriage beyond its political and social 
expediency: 
The love between husband and wife is evidently a natural feeling, for 
nature has made man even more of a pairing than a political animal in 
so far as the family is an older and more fundamental thing than the 
state, and the instinct to form communities is less widespread among 
animals than the habit of procreation. Among the generality of 
animals male and female come together for this sole purpose [of 
procreation]. But human beings cohabit not only to get children but to 
provide whatever is necessary to a fully lived life. From the outset the 
partners perform distinct duties, the man having one set, the woman 
another. So by pooling their individual contributions [into a common 
stock] they help each other out. Accordingly there is general 
agreement that conjugal affection combines the useful with the 
pleasant. But it may also embody a moral ideal, when husband and 
wife are virtuous persons. For man and woman have each their own 
special excellence, and this may be a source of pleasure to both. 
 
 18 See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, at xi, 7 (Ernest Barker ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 
reprt. ed. 1972) (c. 384 B.C.E). 
 19 Id. at 1. 
 20 Id. at 8. 
 21 Id. at 3. 
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Children too, it is agreed, are a bond between the parents—which 
explains why childless unions are more likely to be dissolved. The 
children do not belong to one parent more than the other, and it is the 
joint ownership of something valuable that keeps people from 
separating.22 
The Roman Stoics repeated and glossed these classical Greek views about 
monogamous marriage, even while many of them celebrated celibacy as the 
higher ideal for philosophers seeking quiet contemplation. For example, 
Musonius Rufus (born c. 30 C.E.) described marriage in robust companionate 
terms that prefigured the familiar language of the Western marriage liturgy: 
The husband and wife . . . should come together for the purpose of 
making a life in common and of procreating children, and 
furthermore of regarding all things in common between them, and 
nothing peculiar or private to one or the other, not even their own 
bodies. The birth of a human being which results from such a union is 
to be sure something marvelous, but it is not yet enough for the 
relation of husband and wife, inasmuch as quite apart from marriage 
it could result from any other sexual union, just as in the case of 
animals. But in marriage there must be above all perfect 
companionship and mutual love of husband and wife, both in health 
and in sickness and under all conditions, since it was with desire for 
this as well as for having children that both entered upon marriage.23 
Musonius further insisted that sexual intercourse is “justified only when it 
occurs in marriage and is indulged in for the purpose of begetting children.”24 
He praised those lawgivers who “consider[] the increase of the homes of the 
citizens [through procreation] the most fortunate thing for the cities and the 
decrease of them [through infanticide] the most shameful thing.”25 Indeed, he 
wrote, “whoever destroys human marriage destroys the home, the city, and the 
whole human race.”26 
The Roman law jurists reflected these views as well. Marriage was a 
prominent public concern for Rome from the beginning, and marriage was 
 
 22 ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 225–26 (J.A.K. Thomson ed. & trans., Urwin Bros. Ltd. 1953) 
(c. 350 B.C.E.). The interpolation “into a common stock” is an alternative translation that appears in several 
other translations of this passage. 
 23 MUSONIUS RUFUS, WHAT IS THE CHIEF END OF MARRIAGE (c. 100), reprinted in CORA E. LUTZ, 
MUSONIUS RUFUS: THE ROMAN SOCRATES 89, 89 (Cora E. Lutz trans., 1947). 
 24 Id. at 87. 
 25 Id. at 97. 
 26 Id. at 93; see also Roy B. Ward, Musonius and Paul on Marriage, 36 NEW TESTAMENT STUD. 281 
(1990). 
WITTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2015 12:28 PM 
2015] THE NATURE OF FAMILY, THE FAMILY OF NATURE 601 
considered “an honourable and desirable condition . . . that ensured the 
continuation of the human race and provided a sort of communal immortality” 
for Rome itself and for the extended families that made it up.27 A number of 
Roman jurists had “a sentimental ideal” of marriage “focused on a standard of 
companionate (but not necessarily equal) marriage and a delight in children as 
individuals and as symbols of home comforts” and perpetuators of the family 
name, property, and household.28 Unlike the philosophers who focused on the 
functions and ethics of marriage, the Roman jurists focused on the form of 
marriage and the formalities that attended its proper creation, maintenance, and 
dissolution. They also focused on the critical relationships between parents and 
children, especially surrounding family property and inheritance.29 All these 
dense legal rules presupposed a basic natural law of the family. “The law of 
nature is the law instilled by nature in all creatures,” Emperor Justinian put it in 
summary. “It is not merely for mankind but for all creatures of the sky, earth 
and sea. From it comes [the union] between male and female, which we call 
marriage; also the bearing and bringing up of children.”30 In the mid-third 
century, the Roman jurist Modestinus wrote that under the natural law a 
“lawful marriage” is “the union of a man and a woman, a partnership for life 
involving divine as well as human law.”31 His teacher Ulpian called marriage 
an inseparable communion and a sacred and enduring union to be voluntarily 
contracted for the sake of “marital affection” and the propagation of 
offspring.32 
The Western Christian tradition inherited and used these Graeco-Roman 
teachings on the nature of marriage and family. To be sure, the marital 
household was more than a natural institution for Christians; for them, it was 
also a contractual, economic, social, and spiritual association, whether 
 
 27 JUDITH EVANS GRUBBS, LAW AND FAMILY IN LATE ANTIQUITY: THE EMPEROR CONSTANTINE’S 
MARRIAGE LEGISLATION 64 (1995). 
 28 Suzanne Dixon, The Sentimental Ideal of the Roman Family, in MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN 
IN ANCIENT ROME 99, 111 (Beryl Rawson ed., 1991); see also SUZANNE DIXON, THE ROMAN FAMILY (1992). 
 29 For a good illustration of rules and cases, see BRUCE W. FRIER & THOMAS A.J. MCGINN, A CASEBOOK 
ON ROMAN FAMILY LAW (2004). 
 30 JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 36–37 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1987) 
(c. 533) (rendering “conjugatio” as “intercourse” rather than “union”); see THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 19 
(W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1988) (c. 161) (“But the law which natural reason 
makes for all mankind is applied in the same way everywhere. It is called ‘the law of all peoples’ because it is 
common to every nation.”); see also id. at 13–26 (describing the various civil laws of marriage and family life 
in Rome and their consonance with this law of nations). 
 31 2 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 657–58 (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger eds., Alan Watson trans., 
Univ. of Pa. Press 1985) (c. 530). 
 32 Id. at 658, 707–10, 731–33; 3 id. at 182–200; JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 43.  
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sacramental or covenantal.33 But, at its foundation, marriage and the family 
was first and foremost a natural institution. Already in Paradise, Christians 
argued, God had brought the first man and the first woman together as “two in 
one flesh” and commanded them to “be fruitful and multiply.”34 God had 
created them as social creatures, naturally inclined and attracted to each other. 
God had given them the physical capacity to join together and to beget 
children. God had commanded them to love, help, and nurture each other and 
to inculcate in each other and in their children the love of God, neighbor, and 
self. These duties and qualities of marriage, the Christian tradition taught, 
continued after the fall into sin. After the fall, however, marriages also became 
a remedy for lust, a balm to incontinence. Rather than allowing sinful persons 
to burn with lust, God provided the remedy of marriage for parties to direct 
their natural drives and passions to the service and love of the spouse, the 
child, and the broader community.35 
Like the Greeks and Romans, early Christian writers emphasized the public 
and private goods of marriage and the family.36 The leading Western Church 
Father, St. Augustine (354–430), called marriage a “holy and true fellowship” 
and “friendship”37 and the marital household the “seedbed” of the city,38 the 
“the first natural bond of human society.”39 He quoted his famous Greek 
contemporary, St. John Chrysostom (345–407) about the political and social 
utility of the family: “The love of husband and wife is the force that welds 
society together. . . . Because when harmony prevails, the children are raised 
well, the household is kept in order, and neighbors and relatives praise the 
result. Great benefits, both for families and states, are thus produced.”40 
Marriage also brought with it the goods of fidelity, children, and stability to the 
couple and their children.41 As a contract of fidelity, marriage gave husband 
and wife an equal power over the other’s body, an equal right to demand that 
 
 33 See WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra note 1, at 2–4.  
 34 Genesis 1:27–28, 2:23–24; Matthew 19:5; 1 Corinthians 6:16; Ephesians 5:31 (Revised Standard). 
 35 See sources and discussion in WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT, supra note 1, at 31–75. 
 36 See overview in John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019 
(2001). 
 37 AUGUSTINE, ON THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE (c. 401), reprinted in 3 A SELECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE 
AND POST‑NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 397, 403 (Philip Schaff ed., Peter Holmes et al. trans., 
reprt. ed. 1975). 
 38 AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS 667 (R.W. Dyson ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1998) (c. 426). 
 39 AUGUSTINE, supra note 37, at 399. 
 40 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, HOMILY 20 ON EPHESIANS 5:22–33 (c. 386), reprinted in ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM 
ON MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE 43, 44 (Catharine Roth & David Anderson trans., 1986). 
 41 See id. 
WITTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2015 12:28 PM 
2015] THE NATURE OF FAMILY, THE FAMILY OF NATURE 603 
the other spouse avoid adultery, and an equal claim to the “service, in a certain 
measure, of sustaining each other’s weakness, for the avoidance of illicit 
intercourse.”42 As a created, natural means of procreation, Christian marriage 
rendered sexual intercourse licit, a proper means and manner of fulfilling 
God’s command to “be fruitful and multiply.”43 As a kind of “sacramental 
bond,” marriage was a source and symbol of permanent union and household 
stability between Christians.44 
Also like the Greeks and Romans, Christians taught that marriage is subject 
to the laws of nature. For them, natural law was not only, as the Roman jurists 
had put it, the law that “nature has taught to all animals,” which gave them 
natural inclinations to protect, preserve, and perpetuate themselves through 
procreation.45 Natural law was also what twelfth-century canonist Gratian 
called the “natural instinct[s]” or “intuitions” that are unique to humans and the 
“common” customs and conventions that have emerged among humans over 
time.46 These distinctly human qualities of natural law, Christians taught, are 
known through reason and conscience, and often confirmed, illustrated, and 
sometimes enhanced by the Bible. Natural law, in this fuller human sense, 
helped to channel fit persons’ natural drive and determination to marry when 
they reach the age of puberty; to conceive children and nurture and educate 
them until adulthood; and to remain bonded to their kin who are by nature 
inclined to serve and support each other, especially in times of need, frailty, 
and old age.47 The natural law prescribed heterosexual, lifelong unions 
between a couple, featuring mutual support and faithfulness.48 It proscribed 
incest, bestiality, buggery, sodomy, pederasty, masturbation, contraception, 
abortion, and other unnatural and non-procreative sexual activities and 
relations.49 
 
 42 AUGUSTINE, THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE (c. 401), reprinted in SAINT AUGUSTINE: TREATISES ON 
MARRIAGE AND OTHER SUBJECTS 3, 16–17 (Roy J. Deferrari ed., Charles T. Wilcox et al. trans., 1955). 
 43 Id. at 10. 
 44 AUGUSTINE, ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE (c. 401), reprinted in 5 A SELECT LIBRARY OF THE 
NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, supra note 37, at 263, 268. 
 45 JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 30, at 45–47; THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 31, at 1; see 
also GRATIAN, THE TREATISE ON LAWS (DECRETUM DD. 1–20) WITH THE ORDINARY GLOSS (c. 1472), 
reprinted in 2 STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CANON LAW 6–7 (Augustine Thompson & James 
Gordley, trans., 1993) (providing translation). 
 46 GRATIAN, supra note 45, at 6–7. 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See sample texts in RUDOLF WEIGAND, DIE NATURRECHTSLEHRE DUR LEGISTEN UND DEKRETISTEN 
VON IRNERIUS BIS ACCURSIUS UND VON GRATIAN BIS JOHANNES TEUTONICUS [THE NATURAL LAW TEACHINGS 
OF THE CIVILIANS AND DECRETISTS FROM IRNERIUS TO JOHN TEUTONICUS] 283–98 (1967). For additional 
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B. Thomas Aquinas 
Dominican friar, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), drew an important 
distinction between the primary and secondary precepts of the natural law.50 
Primary natural law precepts, he said, deal with activities that are primal, 
inescapable; one cannot help but obey them.51 For example, each person must 
eat, drink, and sleep to survive.52 Secondary natural law precepts guide 
activities consistent with these primary precepts, but which “vary according to 
the various conditions of persons, times, and other circumstances.”53 These 
activities are not “binding in all cases, but only in the majority.”54 Primary 
precepts command that everyone must eat, drink, and sleep, or they die.55 
Secondary precepts help determine the appropriate amounts of food, drink, and 
sleep for each person in different circumstances.56 
The natural law of procreation is similar, Aquinas argued, but its secondary 
precepts are more complex. Primary natural law precepts command that the 
human race must procreate.57 If no one has children, the human race will die 
out. Secondary natural law precepts, however, teach that not every person 
needs to procreate.58 Some individuals are called to a life of chastity and 
virginity.59 Others are called to marriage, and they produce children in 
substitution for those who do not.60 In addition, secondary precepts teach that 
some ways of procreating are more naturally just, healthy, and beneficial than 
 
detailed sources, see BRUNDAGE, supra note 3; and PHILIP LYNDON REYNOLDS, MARRIAGE IN THE WESTERN 
CHURCH: THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF MARRIAGE DURING THE PATRISTIC AND EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIODS 
(1994). 
 50 5 THOMAS AQUINAS: SUMMA THEOLOGICA 2796–97 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
trans., Thomas Moore Publ’g 1948) (c. 1274) [hereinafter AQUINAS, ST]; see also JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: 
MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 1 (1998). For later uses of these distinctions, building on Aquinas, 
see FRANCISCO SUAREZ, DE LEGIBUS, AC DEO LEGISLATORE [A TREATISE ON LAWS AND GOD THE LAWGIVER] 
(1612), reprinted in 2 SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ 3, 303–07 (Gwladys L. 
Williams et al. trans., 1944); see also THOMAS SANCHEZ, DE SANCTO MATRIMONII SACRAMENTO 
DISPUTATIONUN TOMI TRES [COMMENTARY ON THE HOLY SACRAMENT OF MARRIAGE IN THREE VOLUMES] bk. 
7, fols. 265r–269v (Heredes, Martinii Nutii et Ioannem Meurisum 1617). 
 51 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2795–97. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 2798. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See PHILIP L. REYNOLDS, FOOD AND THE BODY: SOME PECULIAR QUESTIONS IN HIGH MEDIEVAL 
THEOLOGY 4 (1999). 
 56 Id. 
 57 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2795–97. 
 58 See id. at 2798. 
 59 See id. at 2700 (explaining how perfection consists of a “contemplative life”). 
 60 Id. at 2699–700. 
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others.61 After all, children can be produced by rape, fornication, prostitution, 
concubinage, incest, polygamy, and monogamy alike.62 Secondary precepts, 
moreover, teach that procreation means not just conceiving a child but 
nurturing, educating, and preparing him or her for independent life.63 Animals 
choose among these various methods of procreation and nurture by following 
their natural instincts of attraction and revulsion.64 Humans follow these same 
natural instincts, too, but they also use their reason and conscience to form 
norms and habits of moral behavior in response.65 Those who attend properly 
to the natural law understand that polygamy, incest, rape, fornication, 
prostitution, and concubinage are inferior modes of procreation, for they cause 
disproportionate harm to women and children.66 Exclusive and enduring 
monogamous marriages accord better with the secondary precepts of natural 
law.67 
Aquinas elaborated on this argument in his Summa Contra Gentiles, a 
sophisticated work of apologetics designed in part to present the teachings of 
Christianity to Muslims, Jews, and other foreign “peoples” (gentiles) of the 
day.68 Here he analyzed what he considered to be the deep natural construction 
of all human marriages, not just Christian marriages, as ideally monogamous, 
exclusive, and indissoluble unions.69 
Aquinas built his account in part on the extensive observations of the 
reproductive strategies of various animals just published by his teacher, Albert 
the Great (c. 1193–1280).70 He also built on Aristotle’s teaching that humans 
are marital animals before they are political animals, and that most men and 
women have a natural attraction to each other and have a natural inclination to 
produce “something of the same nature as themselves” as an act of 
 
 61 Id. at 2798. 
 62 See id. at 2766–816. 
 63 Id. at 2699–700. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 2795–96. 
 66 Id. at 2795–98. 
 67 Id.  
 68 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, bk. III, pt. II (Vernon J. Bourke trans., Univ. of 
Notre Dame Press 1975) (c. 1260) [hereinafter AQUINAS, SCG]. I am grateful to the late Professor Don S. 
Browning for alerting me to these texts. For his analysis of these materials, see BROWNING ET AL., supra note 
13, at 113–24.  
 69 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 120–21, 142–52. 
 70 See, e.g., ALBERT THE GREAT, QUESTIONS CONCERNING ARISTOTLE’S ON ANIMALS 185–202, 225–65, 
302–36, 439–72 (Irven M. Resnick & Kenneth F. Kitchell, Jr. trans., Catholic Univ. Press of Am. 2008) 
(c. 1258). I am grateful to Professor Philip L. Reynolds for bringing this text to my attention. 
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self-preservation and perpetuation.71 But Aquinas added several new insights 
into the unique strategies of human reproduction through enduring pair 
bonding, rather than through random or multiple sexual associations. 
Aquinas first observed that humans are unique among other animals in 
producing utterly fragile and helpless infants.72 Unlike other young animals, 
human babies cannot soon run, fly, or swim away.73 They need nurture, 
protection, food, shelter, and education for a number of years—ideally from 
both their mother and father and their respective kin networks.74 
[T]here are animals whose offspring are able to seek food 
immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother; and in 
these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those 
whose offspring needs the support of both parents, although for a 
short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In 
man, however, since the child needs the parents’ care for a long time, 
there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even 
the generic nature inclines.75 
“[A]mong some animals where the female is able to take care of the 
upbringing of offspring, male and female do not remain together for any time 
after the act of generation,” Aquinas continued.76 This is the case with cats, 
dogs, cattle, and other herding animals, where newborns quickly become 
independent after a brief nursing period.77 “But in the case of animals of which 
the female is not able to provide for upbringing of children, the male and 
female do stay together after the act of generation as long as is necessary for 
the upbringing and instruction of the offspring.”78 In these latter cases, this 
inclination to stay and help with the feeding, protection, and teaching of the 
offspring is “naturally implanted in the male.”79 Birds are a good example: 
they pair for the entire mating season and cooperate in building their nests; in 
brooding their eggs; and in feeding, protecting, and teaching their fledglings 
until they finally take flight on their own.80 
 
 71 See supra text accompanying notes 18–22. 
 72 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2699–700. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 2700. 
 76 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 144. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 144–45, 151. 
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Human beings push this pair-bonding pattern of reproduction much further, 
Aquinas continued, not only because their tiny children remain dependent for 
so much longer but also because these children place heavy and shifting 
demands on their parents as they slowly mature.81 Except in rare cases, this 
requires the effort of both parents and the kin structures they each represent.82 
[T]he female in the human species is not at all able to take care of the 
upbringing of offspring by herself, since the needs of human life 
demand many things which cannot be provided by one person alone. 
Therefore it is appropriate to human nature to remain together with a 
woman after the generative act, and not leave her immediately to 
have such relations with another woman, as is the practice of 
fornicators.83 
For this reason, human males and females are naturally inclined to remain 
together and to remain faithful to each other for the sake of their dependent 
child(ren). 
A man will remain with the mother and care for the child, however, only if 
he is certain that he is the father, Aquinas continued.84 A woman will usually 
know that a child is hers because she carries it to term and then nurses the child 
thereafter.85 A man will know that a child is his only if he is sure that his wife 
has been sexually faithful to him alone.86 Only with an exclusive monogamous 
relationship can a man be sure that if his wife becomes pregnant that he is the 
father.87 And only then will a man be likely to join his wife in care for their 
child.88 “Man naturally desires to know his offspring,” Aquinas wrote; “and 
this knowledge would be completely destroyed if there were several males for 
one female. Therefore that one female is for one male is a consequence of a 
natural instinct.”89 
Aquinas recognized that paternal certainty alone was often not enough to 
bind a man to his wife and child. He believed that human males, like other 
 
 81 Id. at 144–45. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 150–51. 
 85 Id.; see also 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2699 (“Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed 
unless it have certain and definite parents, and this would not be the case unless there were a tie between the 
man and a definite woman, and it is in this that matrimony consists.”). 
 86 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 150–51. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 151; 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2724–25 (explaining the marriage goods). 
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male animals, craved sex with many females much more than they craved 
permanent attachment to one woman.90 But a rational man, he insisted, can be 
induced to care for his children and cleave to his wife because of his natural 
instinct for self-preservation.91 Once a man realizes that a given child is 
literally an extension of himself, a part and product of his own body and being, 
“flesh of my flesh, bone of my bone,” he will care for the infant as he is 
inclined to care for his own body.92 And once he begins this parental process, 
his attachment to that child will settle and deepen, and he will remain with the 
child and its mother.93 He will come to enjoy the interaction with and growth 
of his child, and he will also enjoy the sexual intimacy and domestic support of 
his wife as the family remains together.94 
Both faithful and indissoluble marriage, Aquinas concluded, provides the 
context for this parental-lifelong investment in children.95 Faithful and 
exclusive marriage provides paternal certainty—ensuring a man that he is 
investing in his own children, not those with whom he has no biological tie.96 
Indissoluble and enduring marriage also provides parental investment—
ensuring children of the support of their parents for their many years of 
maturation.97 These children will later reciprocate when their parents grow old 
and fragile and enter into their own second childhood, becoming needy and 
dependent anew. 
To these two arguments from the nature of human reproduction and 
parental attachment, Aquinas added a third argument from natural justice and 
fairness to show that monogamy was superior to polygamy in humans—an 
important issue for a work of apologetics that sought to appeal to Jews and 
Muslims of his day, some of whom practiced polygamy.98 Aquinas rejected 
polyandry (one female with multiple males) because it was naturally unjust to 
 
 90 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 150–51; 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2724–25, 2795.  
 91 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2725–26; see 3 id. at 1293–96 (describing a father’s love for his 
child as “love for himself”). 
 92 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–48; see also Genesis 2:23.  
 93 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–48. 
 94 Id.; see also 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2725–26 (explaining how offspring are a “good” of 
marriage). 
 95 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–50. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See details in WITTE, POLYGAMY, supra note 1 (assessing in chapter 1 the transition from polygamy to 
monogamy in ancient Judaism, and in chapter 4 the medieval case for monogamy over polygamy).  
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children.99 If a woman had sex with several husbands, he argued, it removed 
the likelihood that the children born to that woman would clearly belong to any 
one husband.100 This would undermine paternal certainty and consequent 
paternal investment in their children’s care.101 The children would suffer from 
neglect, and the wife would be overburdened trying to care for them and trying 
to tend to her multiple husbands and their rampant sexual needs at once.102 
Aquinas rejected polygyny (one male with multiple females) because it was 
naturally unjust to wives.103 Polygyny did not necessarily erode paternal 
certainty, Aquinas allowed.104 So long as his multiple wives were faithful to 
him alone, a man could be assured of being the father of children born in his 
household.105 But this required a man to pen up his wives like cattle, isolating 
them from other roving males even when his own energies to tend to them 
were already dissipated over the several women and children gathered in his 
household.106 While locked up at home, the wives were reduced to servants, 
and set in perennial competition with each other and with rival children for 
resources and access to their shared husband.107 This is not marriage, “but, 
instead, a sort of slavery,” said Aquinas.108 It betrayed the fundamental 
requirements of fidelity and mutuality between husband and wife, the 
undivided and undiluted love and friendship that become a proper marriage.109 
True marital faith and “friendship consists in an equality” that should never be 
divided, Aquinas wrote.110 It requires not only forgoing sexual intercourse with 
another and honoring the reasonable sexual advances of one’s spouse.111 It also 
requires the commitment to be indissolubly united with one’s spouse in body 
and mind; to be willing to share fully and equally in the person, property, 
 
 99 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–48, 151–52. See generally 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 
2794–97 (discussing whether it is within the natural law to have several wives). 
 100 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–48, 151–52. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 150–52; 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2794–801. 
 104 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2794–801. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 2794–98. 
 108 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 148, 152. 
 109 See id. 
 110 See id. at 152; 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2795–96.  
 111 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 152. 
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lineage, and reputation—indeed, in the “entire life”—of one’s spouse.112 It is 
to be and bear with each other in youth and in old age, in sickness and in 
health, in prosperity and in adversity. Polygyny undercuts all of those 
fundamental goods of marriage. 
So, if it is not lawful for the wife to have several husbands, since this 
is contrary to the certainty as to offspring, it would not be lawful, on 
the other hand, for a man to have several wives, for the friendship of 
husband and wife would not be free, but somewhat servile. And this 
argument is corroborated by experience, for among husbands having 
plural wives the wives have a status like that of servants.113 
Natural law and natural justice thus teach monogamy. 
Aquinas’ concern for natural justice and fairness to women and children 
also framed his arguments against divorce and remarriage—which he regarded 
as a form of “successive polygamy” or “digamy,” as the Christian tradition had 
called it.114 His real concern was with “voluntary divorce”—unilateral, no-fault 
divorce as we would call it today.115 This option was especially unjust to 
wives, Aquinas said, for they would be left vulnerable to their husband’s 
decisions to divorce them when they became barren or lost their youthful 
beauty.116 If they had the right to divorce, many men, given their proclivity to 
wander sexually, would not be encouraged to develop the comfortable habits 
of monogamous fidelity to wife and child that the natural structure of 
monogamy encourages.117 Many women would be discarded in middle age, 
without support either from their husbands, who would likely go on to other 
women, or from their fathers, who would likely be dead at that point. The 
notion that a woman could have her own career to support herself, beyond that 
of the cloister or church guild, was simply not within the medieval 
imagination. This made divorce naturally wrong, said Aquinas: “So, if any 
 
 112 Id. at 147; 4 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2171–72; 5 id. at 2710–11 (calling matrimony a joining of 
the bodies and minds of the husband and wife). See further texts and discussion in FINNIS, supra note 50, at 
143–54. 
 113 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 152. 
 114 WITTE, POLYGAMY, supra note 1 (assessing in chapter 2 the arguments for monogamy versus 
polygamy in the early church, and in chapter 4 the medieval case for monogamy over polygamy). 
 115 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2806–11; AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–50. St. Thomas 
added an argument against divorce that rankles modern egalitarian sensibilities: “the female needs the male, 
not merely for the sake of generation, as in the case of other animals, but also for the sake of government, 
since the male is both more perfect in reasoning and stronger in powers.” AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 
147–48. 
 116 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 147–48. 
 117 Id. at 147–50. 
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man took a woman in the time of her youth, when beauty and fecundity were 
hers, and then sent her away after she had reached an advanced age, he would 
damage that woman, contrary to natural equity” or natural justice.118 
Removing divorce as an option for properly married couples not only 
provided security for wives but also fostered “good behavior” in the marital 
household, said Aquinas.119 The husband and wife will eventually be less 
prone to adultery, knowing that they will have to live either alone or with their 
spouse and that their adulterous lover will remain forever forbidden to them, 
even after the death of their spouse.120 The marital couple will be more 
inclined to fix “the sources of disagreements” so as to reach “a more solid 
affection” for each other and their relatives, making life together more 
agreeable.121 And they “will be more solicitous in their care for domestic 
possessions when they keep in mind that they will remain continually in 
possession of these same things.”122 
Voluntary divorce was also naturally unjust to children, Aquinas continued, 
for it squandered their inheritance and impeded their ability to take care of 
their parents when those parents most needed help at the end of their lives.123 
By the intention of nature, marriage is directed to the rearing of the 
offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its whole life. Hence 
it is of natural law that parents should lay up for their children, and 
that children should be their parents’ heirs. Therefore, since the 
offspring is the common good of husband and wife, the dictate of the 
natural law requires the latter to live together for ever inseparably: 
and so the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law.124 
This combination of natural arguments for monogamy and against 
polygamy in various forms would become a staple for the Western legal 
tradition. The core of the argument was focused on the natural needs and 
tendencies of men, women, and children, and the premium placed on stable 
monogamous marriage as the proper site for sexual exchange, mutual adult 
dependency, and the procreation and nurture of long dependent children. The 
 
 118 Id. at 147–48. 
 119 Id. at 149. 
 120 BRUNDAGE, supra note 3, at 39–40, 172. 
 121 AQUINAS, SCG, supra note 68, at 149–50. 
 122 Id. 
 123 5 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 2806–07. 
 124 Id. (citing 2 Corinthians 12:14). 
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core of the natural justice argument was focused on the injustice and harm 
done to women and children by the multiplication or replacement of spouses. 
To these natural arguments Aquinas and others added deep and complex 
theological arguments about the sacramental nature of marriage that helped to 
stabilize and solidify these intra-family relations and responsibilities.125 This 
strengthened his case for the exclusive and indissoluble monogamous 
marriages of Christians. But even stripped of its theological overlay and left to 
stand alone, Aquinas’ arguments from nature were powerful. They were also 
enduring. Many later jurists and philosophers—Catholics, Protestants, and 
Enlightenment liberals alike—built on these early arguments to defend faithful 
monogamous marriages.126 And today, a number of anthropologists and 
evolutionary scientists have shown that enduring pair-bonding is the most 
expedient means for human reproduction, given the realities of long and 
demanding human infant dependency and the perennial sex drives of humans. 
Indeed, human reproduction by enduring pair-bonding is described by modern 
evolutionary scientists like Bernard Chapais as the “deep structure” of survival 
that the human species has evolved.127 In his own premodern way, Aquinas 
saw this already 750 years ago. Yes, he called it the human nature that God has 
created, rather than a reproductive survival strategy that the human species has 
evolved. But the conclusion was the same: exclusive and enduring marriages 
and families are the best means of human reproduction and social flourishing. 
Aquinas’ insights into the natural foundations of marriage and the family 
were not only prescient of modern scientific teachings. They also helped form 
the foundation for an emerging medieval law of natural rights for children and 
their parents.128 The rights of the parents to marriage and procreation were 
 
 125 Id. at 2699–706. See the new detailed study of PHILIP L. REYNOLDS, HOW MARRIAGE BECAME ONE OF 
THE SACRAMENTS: THE SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY OF MARRIAGE FROM ITS MEDIEVAL ORIGINS TO THE 
COUNCIL OF TRENT (forthcoming). 
 126 See WITTE, POLYGAMY, supra note 1 (assessing in chapters 5–9 polygamous experiments in early 
Protestantism, the Calvinist case against polygamy, the English case against polygamy, the early modern 
liberal case for polygamy, and the enlightenment case against polygamy). 
 127 BERNARD CHAPAIS, PRIMEVAL KINSHIP: HOW PAIR-BONDING GAVE BIRTH TO HUMAN SOCIETY 10 
(2008); see also PETER B. GRAY & KERMYT G. ANDERSON, FATHERHOOD: EVOLUTION AND HUMAN PATERNAL 
BEHAVIOR 21–22 (2010); MELVIN A. KONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF CHILDHOOD: RELATIONSHIPS, EMOTIONS, 
MIND 325–28 (2010). However, the topic remains controversial. See, e.g., HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR: 
A DARWINIAN PERSPECTIVE (Laura L. Betzig et al. eds., 1988); MIND THE GAP: TRACING THE ORIGINS OF 
HUMAN UNIVERSALS (Peter M. Kappeler & Joan B. Silk eds., 2010). 
 128 On medieval rights talk, see BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL 
RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW, AND CHURCH LAW, 1150–1625 (1997), and R.H. Helmholz, Human Rights in the 
Canon Law, in CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 99 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. 
Alexander eds., 2010).  
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based on their natural duties “to be fruitful and multiply” by licit conjunctions 
of “two in one flesh.”129 Their rights of parentage were further based on the 
child’s natural duty to “[h]onor your father and mother”130 and the 
community’s duty to “let the children come” to receive their love, support, and 
nurture.131 The rights of children, in turn, were the correlatives of the duties 
that parents owed to their children. As Jesus had put it in the Sermon on the 
Mount, 
[W]hat man of you, if his son asks him for bread, will give him a 
stone? Or if he asks for a fish, will give him a serpent? If you then, 
who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how 
much more will your Father in heaven give good things to those who 
ask him! So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to 
them; for this is the law and the prophets.132 
It was biblical texts like these, together with the naturalist arguments of 
Aquinas and others just outlined, that inspired medieval jurists to develop 
especially the law of children’s rights.133 By the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, canon law and civil law texts alike spoke about a child’s right to life 
and the means to sustain life; the right to care, protection, nurture, and 
education; the later right to emancipation from the home and the right to 
contract marriage, enter a profession, or join the clergy or monastery; and the 
right to support and eventual inheritance from their natural or adoptive 
parents.134 Furthermore, illegitimate children had special rights to oblation in a 
 
 129 Genesis 1:28, 2:24; Matthew 19:5; 1 Corinthians 6:16; Ephesians 5:31 (Revised Standard). 
 130 Exodus 20:12.  
 131 Matthew 19:14 (Revised Standard). These issues have received in-depth discussion. See Patrick 
McKinley Brennan, Children Play with God: A Contemporary Thomistic Understanding of the Child, in THE 
VOCATION OF THE CHILD 189 (Patrick McKinley Brennan ed., 2008); Anthony J. Kelley, Hope for Unbaptized 
Infants: Holy Innocents After All?, in THE VOCATION OF THE CHILD, supra, at 215; Charles J. Reid, Jr., The 
Rights of Children in Medieval Canon Law, in THE VOCATION OF THE CHILD, supra, at 245; Philip L. 
Reynolds, Thomas Aquinas and the Paradigms of Childhood, in THE VOCATION OF THE CHILD, supra, at 154; 
see also Judith M. Gundry, Children in the Gospel of Mark, with Special Attention to Jesus’ Blessing of the 
Children (Mark 10:13-16) and the Purpose of Mark, in THE CHILD IN THE BIBLE 143, 148–49 (Marcia J. Bunge 
et al. eds., 2008); Marianne Meye Thompson, Children in the Gospel of John, in THE CHILD IN THE BIBLE, 
supra, at 195; Keith J. White, “He Placed a Little Child in the Midst”: Jesus, the Kingdom, and Children, in 
THE CHILD IN THE BIBLE, supra, at 353, 364–65. 
 132 Matthew 7:9–12 (Revised Standard); see also 3 AQUINAS, ST, supra note 50, at 1293–96. 
 133 See detailed sources and discussion in CHARLES J. REID, JR., POWER OVER THE BODY, EQUALITY IN 
THE FAMILY: RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 92, 153–210 (2004); WITTE, SINS, 
supra note 1, at 49–134; R.H. Helmholz, Children’s Rights and the Canon Law: Law and Practice in Later 
Medieval England, 67 JURIST 39 (2007); R.H. Helmholz, And Were There Children’s Rights in Early Modern 
England? The Canon Law and ‘Intra-family Violence’ in England, 1400–1640, 1 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 23 
(1993); and Reid, Jr., supra note 131, at 243. 
 134 WITTE, SINS, supra note 1, at 49–134. 
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monastery or legitimation by their natural or adoptive parents.135 Poor children 
had special rights to relief and shelter.136 Abused children had special rights to 
sanctuary and foster care.137 Abandoned or orphaned children had special 
rights to foundling houses and orphanages.138 All these were real and 
actionable “subjective” rights for children that medieval church courts and 
state courts helped to enforce.139 
C. Francisco Vitoria 
In the sixteenth century, these Thomistic ideas about the natural law, 
natural rights, and natural justice of sex, marriage, and family life were 
expanded and systematized by a series of Spanish jurists, philosophers, and 
theologians. Most of them, like Aquinas, were members of the Dominican 
Order, and most of them were gathered at the University of Salamanca, one of 
the great intellectual centers of early modern Spain.140 To illustrate, let us 
focus on the work of one early titan of this Spanish school, Francisco de 
Vitoria (c. 1492–1546). Vitoria is most famous today for his remarkable 
defense of the rights of the American Indians against colonial authority.141 He 
is also known for his treatises on the powers of church and state, on the power 
of the papacy and of councils within the church, and on the international laws 
of war and peace.142 In his own day, Vitoria was most famous for his lectures 
and commentaries on the work of Thomas Aquinas. He commented on 
Aquinas’ Summa Theologica as well as Aquinas’ commentaries on Peter 
Lombard’s discussion of marriage in his Book of Sentences.143 Vitoria also 
 
 135 Id. at 98–99. 
 136 Id. at 98–103. 
 137 Id. at 126–27. 
 138 Id.  
 139 Id. at 122–34. 
 140 ANNABEL S. BRETT, LIBERTY, RIGHT, AND NATURE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN LATER SCHOLASTIC 
THOUGHT 1, 123 (1997); Rudolf Schüber, Moral Self-Ownership and Ius Possessionis in Late Scholastics, in 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY-MODERN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 149, 154–57 (Virpi Mäkinen & 
Petter Korman eds., 2006); TIERNEY, supra note 128, at 207–315.  
 141 FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA DE INDIS ET DE JURE BELLI RELECTIONES [REFLECTIONS ON THE INDIANS 
AND THE LAW OF WAR BY FRANCISCO VITORIA] (Ernest Nys ed., Carnegie Inst. of Washington 1917) (1557) 
[hereinafter VITORIA, REFLECTIONS]. 
 142 Id.  
 143 FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, COMENTARIOS A LA SECUNDA SECUNDAE DE SANTO TOMÁS [COMMENTARIES 
ON PART II-II OF SAINT THOMAS] (Vicente Beltrán de Heredia ed., Salamanca 1935) (c. 1536) [hereinafter 
VITORIA, COMMENTARIES]. These Commentaries are excerpted in FRANCISCO DE VITORIA POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 341–51 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991) [hereinafter VITORIA, POLITICAL 
WRITINGS]. Vitoria’s analysis on marriage is also reflected in FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE JUSTITIA ET 
FORTITUDINE [ON JUSTICE AND STRENGTH] (Vicente Beltrán de Heredia ed., Salamanca 1935) (c. 1536), and 
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lectured at length on marriage in his own courses, and some of his students’ 
lecture notes were published posthumously as a pithy Summa on Marriage, 
which remained in print for two centuries after his death.144 
In a number of these works, Vitoria elaborated a sophisticated natural law 
theory, including a natural law of marriage and family life, building on the 
insights of Aquinas, Aristotle, and various medieval canon lawyers. Natural 
law, he wrote, is both what is reasonable and what is commonly accepted.145 
Nature and custom—the law of nature (ius naturale) and the laws of nations 
(ius gentium)—often coincide.146 Christians can thus look for confirmation of 
the contents of the natural law not only in the pages of Scripture but also in the 
practices of all peoples, even those who operate without Scripture.147 So, when 
Vitoria was asked whether the law of nature gives parents the right to raise 
their own children, he cited not only the familiar passages on parental authority 
in the Bible but also various examples of this rule and practice in ancient and 
modern sources and concluded that “no one could really hold the idea that a 
father is not bound to bring up his children. The fact that everyone agrees is 
evidence in itself” that such a practice is in accord with the natural law.148 
Natural law can also be discerned simply by the way things most naturally and 
commonly operate. “That is natural which in itself belongs to anything, as, for 
instance, the capacity to laugh and to think is natural to man. . . . Similarly with 
the natural law: it is that which is properly and of itself right.”149 
A thought or practice is naturally right either because it is naturally 
permissible or naturally necessary, said Vitoria.150 Christians know that God as 
 
FRANCISCO SUAREZ, COMMENTARIORUM AC DISPUTATIONUM IN TERTIAM PARTEM DIVI THOMAE 
[COMMENTARY AND DISPUTATION ON THE THIRD PART OF SAINT THOMAS] (Moguntia, Sumptibus Arnold 
Mylii 1590). Many of Vitoria’s writings were compiled after his death, both from (partial) manuscripts that he 
left and from student notes on his lectures. 
 144 FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, Relectio de Matrimonio [Reflections on Marriage], in RELECTIONES 
THEOLOGICAE XII [THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 12] (Louvain, Apud Iacobum Boyerium 1557). For a modern 
Spanish–Latin version, see 1 RELECCIONES TEOLÓGICAS DEL MAESTRO FRAY FRANCISCO DE VITORIA 
[THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS OF THE PROFESSOR BROTHER FRANCISCO DE VITORIA] 420–52 (Luis G. Alonso 
Getino ed., Imprenta La Rafa 1934) (1557) [hereinafter THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS], and 2 id. 439–504. For 
further discussion, see GERHARD OTTE, DAS PRIVATRECHT BEI FRANCISCO DE VITORIA [THE PRIVATE LAW IN 
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA] 23–40, 121–32 (1964). 
 145 VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 143, at xiv–xv, 169–72. 
 146 See id. at 281. 
 147 BERNICE HAMILTON, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY SPAIN 12 (1963). 
 148 Id. (quoting Vitoria’s Commentaries on St. Thomas in DE JUSTITIA, supra note 143). 
 149 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Vitoria’s Commentaries on St. Thomas in DE JUSTITIA, supra note 
143); see also texts in VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 143, at 169–72. 
 150 HAMILTON, supra note 147, at 12. 
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the creator of this natural law created things to operate by nature in a given 
predictable way.151 Unless and until God changes the way things naturally are 
(say, through a miracle or an act of force majeure), the patterns and behaviors 
observed in nature are necessarily products and consequences of the natural 
law.152 
For instance, it is necessary for a man to breathe and have two eyes 
and two feet and for the sun to rise tomorrow; but God could arrange 
things differently . . . . Natural law, therefore, is said to be necessary 
because nature cannot reverse the state of things without a divine 
mandate.153 
So it is without the natural law of marriage and the family, said Vitoria.154 
“[W]ithout a divine mandate reversing the whole order of nature, the Ten 
Commandments cannot be other than they are, that is, we ought to worship 
God, honor our parents,” not commit adultery, and not covet our neighbor’s 
wife or household.155 God can change these natural laws, but humans are 
naturally bound to observe them unless and until God changes them.156 
In his Summa on Marriage, Vitoria focused on the natural law of marriage 
and family life.157 He offered a crisp recitation of Aquinas’ arguments about 
the natural configuration of marriage and then expounded on the natural rights 
of spouses, parents, and children.158 God, Vitoria wrote, created marriage as an 
“indissoluble and exclusive” union between a fit man and a fit woman who are 
capable of marriage to each other and not impeded by sundry blood or family 
ties.159 Once these “two have become one flesh in accordance with the law of 
God,” Vitoria wrote, only “God can rent them asunder” because only God can 
change the natural laws of marriage that bind the united couple.160 God created 
marriage with two main ends, Vitoria wrote.161 The “first and most important 
end is the procreation and education of children” and preparation for them to 
 
 151 Id. at 12–13. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. (quoting Vitoria’s Commentaries on St. Thomas in DE JUSTITIA, supra note 143). 
 154 Id. at 13 (quoting Vitoria’s Commentaries on St. Thomas in DE JUSTITIA, supra note 143). 
 155 Id. (quoting Vitoria’s Commentaries on St. Thomas in DE JUSTITIA, supra note 143). 
 156 Id. 
 157 2 THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS, supra note 144, at 442–63. I am grateful to my former student Chris 
Boussard for preparing a preliminary translation of this Spanish text. 
 158 Id. at 442–45. 
 159 Id. at 442–59. 
 160 Id. at 445–49. 
 161 Id. at 442–45. 
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live a natural, rational, and virtuous life.162 “The second end of marriage is the 
mutual fidelity and service of husband and wife to each other.”163 These two 
ends of marriage are interrelated, said Vitoria, and they are tied to the “natural 
design” of marriage as an exclusive and indissoluble union of a husband and 
wife joined together in “one-flesh.”164 “Man is an infirm animal,” and if his 
sinful nature were not constrained by natural laws, “all men would want to 
mate with all women.”165 Such lawless behavior would quickly put men in a 
perennial and violent sexual competition with each other and with all 
women.166 Men would be having sex even with their mothers, sisters, and 
relatives, and raping and ravishing women at will.167 Women who could not 
defend themselves would be reduced to prostitutes or at best concubines.168 
And children born of such “hot frenzy” would suffer miserably.169 “Uncertain 
of their offspring,” men would not invest in care for any child or its mother, 
especially when other sexual outlets were freely at hand.170 Exhausted by 
sexual predation, pregnancy, and then the needs of their infants, “women 
would not have the strength” to provide fully for their child without the father 
present; no other family members would be at hand to fill in, since such a 
natural kin network would not be known.171 
Because of these proclivities, the natural law induces men and women to 
marry unless they are naturally gifted with continence; to support and be 
faithful to each other in all things including in their sex lives; and to work 
together to nurture, protect, and educate their children until they are mature.172 
Faithful and exclusive marriage is “a natural necessity” given our human 
nature, Vitoria wrote.173 Operating under the same natural law, Christians and 
non-Christians alike have thus developed marriage as the mandated institution 
for responsible sex and child rearing.174 And they have learned, often by hard 
and cruel experience, to outlaw fornication, adultery, prostitution, and 
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 172 See id. 
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concubinage—all of which come at the cost of paternal certainty and joint 
investment in their children and with the consequences of harm, deprivation, 
and sometimes death of these children.175 The Bible’s repeated injunctions 
against sexual sin and for marital fidelity and parental care are simply echoes 
of this natural law shared by all civilized peoples.176 
These natural duties governing sex, marriage, and family life give rise to 
natural rights within the family, Vitoria insisted, which can and should be 
reflected in and guaranteed by the positive laws of church and state alike.177 
First, each person has a “natural right” to enter into a marriage only of his or 
her choice.178 No one can be coerced, tricked, or otherwise misled into a 
marriage.179 And if they are, they must be given the unqualified right to seek 
its annulment.180 No pope, prince, or parent can harm or impede this natural 
right.181 “God only can compel” a couple to marry.182 We have examples of 
that in the Bible: for example when God compelled Hosea to marry Gomer, the 
prostitute (or, Vitoria could have added, when God told Joseph to marry Mary, 
his betrothed, despite her seeming infidelity).183 But God generally gets 
involved in marriages only by secretly moving the hearts of a man and woman 
to cultivate true “mutual love and concordance of mind” for and with each 
other.184 Second, husband and wife each have a “natural right” to support, 
protection, and sex from the other—the “conjugal right” as St. Paul had called 
it in 1 Corinthians 7, echoing Mosaic and natural law precedents.185 Given the 
natural obligations each spouse has to remain bound to the other, each has the 
natural right to have the most essential duties and qualities of their marriage 
enforced. This includes not only sexual intercourse but physical, economic, 
and social support and protection.186 Third, fathers and mothers both have a 
“natural right” and a natural duty to raise, nurture, and educate their children 
without interference by another, save in the event of abuse or abandonment of 
 
 175 See id. 
 176 See id. at 442–46. 
 177 See VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 143, at 159–60. 
 178 See 2 THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS, supra note 144, at 442–49. 
 179 See id. 
 180 See id. 
 181 See id. 
 182 See id. at 449. 
 183 See id. at 447–49 (referencing the biblical stories in Hosea 1:2); see also Matthew 1:18–25. 
 184 See 2 THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS, supra note 144, at 449. 
 185 Id. at 442. 
 186 See id. at 442–49. 
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the child.187 This natural right of parentage was so universal to humans that 
even slaves and pagans should enjoy it, Vitoria argued in his tract on The 
Rights of the Indians.188 And fourth, children have a natural right to be raised 
and nurtured by their natural parents, those most inclined by nature to care for 
them.189 
Vitoria went on to argue that even the children of the purported “heathens” 
of newly discovered colonial Latin America could not be coerced into baptism 
or forced to receive Christian instruction contrary to their parents’ wishes.190 
This was a contested issue in his day in Spain, as it had been during the 
crusades and pogroms of the Middle Ages when some authorities condoned 
forcible baptisms and removal of Jewish, Muslim, and pagan children from 
their families to be raised in cloisters or Christian homes.191 Part of Vitoria’s 
objection to such forced spiritual exercises echoed Aquinas’ reservation about 
coercing false faith: “Since in the majority of cases, pagans cannot be coerced 
without scandal or grave spiritual danger, St. Thomas replies quite simply that 
they must not be coerced . . . . So it must be concluded that by natural law 
infidels cannot be forced to accept the faith.”192 A further part of Vitoria’s 
objection was that such practices violated the rights of the parents.193 “For the 
children would be taken away from them: but those children have as yet no 
rights of their own; they live by their parents’ rights, for the natural law gives 
parents the power to direct their children’s lives.”194 
Even if they are slaves in body infidels are not slaves in spiritual 
matters, and so without the consent even of those who are slaves, it is 
not lawful to ensure the salvation of their children. Otherwise it 
would be lawful for the king even to baptize the children of free men, 
for in the matter of religion one man is no more a slave than 
another.195 
Vitoria’s views would become a standard line of argument about the natural 
law and natural rights of marriage and parentage—not only in Catholic circles 
but also in later Protestant and Enlightenment circles. 
 
 187 See id. 
 188 See VITORIA, REFLECTIONS, supra note 141, at 131. 
 189 See id. 
 190 See id. at 145. 
 191 See, e.g., VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS CONVERSION IN THE MIDDLE AGES (James Muldoon ed., 1997).  
 192 HAMILTON, supra note 147, at 114–16 (quoting from VITORIA, COMMENTARIES, supra note 143). 
 193 Id. at 117. 
 194 Id. (quoting from VITORIA, COMMENTARIES, supra note 143). 
 195 Id. (quoting from VITORIA, COMMENTARIES, supra note 143). 
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II. HUGO GROTIUS AND THE EARLY MODERN NATURAL LAW ON SEX AND 
MARRIAGE 
An important conduit through which these (neo-)Thomist ideas of sex, 
marriage, and family life poured into the broader Western legal tradition were 
the writings of the eminent Dutch jurist and theologian Hugo Grotius (1583–
1645).196 Among legal historians, Grotius is prized as the father of 
international law, famous for his pathbreaking writings on the laws of war and 
peace and on the laws of prize and the sea, which became so critical to the 
development of both public and private international law.197 Among church 
historians, Grotius is infamous for defending his fellow Dutchman, Jacob 
Arminius, against charges of “pelagianism,” an act that won him a prison 
sentence for heresy.198 What is forgotten by some legal historians is that 
Grotius was also an avid student of the neo-Thomist writings of the Spanish 
school of Salamanca and that he drew (with ample attribution) many of his 
cardinal legal ideas directly from Francisco Vitoria and others.199 Indeed, some 
historians now call Vitoria, rather than Grotius, the father of international 
law.200 What is forgotten by some church historians is that Grotius was a 
distinguished Protestant theologian in his own right and not just an amateur 
layman seduced by free-will liberals. Grotius wrote several commentaries on 
the New Testament, a learned tract on church–state relations and ecclesiastical 
law, several pamphlets of Christian devotion, and a richly textured work of 
Christian apologetics.201 Drawing on diverse Catholic, Protestant, and classical 
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 197 See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS [THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] (Francis W. Kelsey et 
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 200 Id. at 3, 160. For a good sampling, see generally ANTONIO TRUYOL SERRA, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
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sources, and using the tools of theology, jurisprudence, and natural philosophy 
alike, Grotius set upon a lifelong quest for religious and political peace in 
Europe, which in his day was being devastated by religious warfare.202 
Crafting a common legal understanding of marriage was an important part 
of this effort. “The union of the sexes, whereby the human species is 
continued, is a subject well worthy of the highest legal consideration,” Grotius 
wrote.203 For, as Aristotle taught us, marriage is the seedbed of the republic; 
the first natural association; and the first school of morality, virtue, and good 
citizenship.204 To get this institution right was essential to creating coherent 
national communities, which needed internal stability before they could work 
toward any kind of international legal harmony. Grotius also regarded marriage 
as a “natural right” of all men and women, echoing Vitoria’s view.205 Even 
slaves and captives should be granted this right, Grotius insisted contrary to 
civil law precedents, given that marriage is “[t]he most natural Association” 
known to mankind.206 He regarded celibacy as an option for those few with 
unique abilities or disabilities but thought it “repugnant to the nature of most 
men” and women.207 
Both in his legal and theological writings, Grotius showed full command of 
and respect for biblical norms and conventional Christian principles of 
marriage. He adverted repeatedly to the axial biblical texts of Genesis 1 and 2, 
Matthew 19, 1 Corinthians 7, and Ephesians 5, some of which he further 
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glossed in his New Testament commentaries.208 He pored over the Mosaic 
laws of marriage and the Pauline household codes.209 He cited frequently to the 
marital writings of Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria, and hundreds of other 
classical and Christian authorities.210 “Christianity [is] by far the most 
excellent of all possible religious systems,” he wrote proudly, in no small part 
because “Christians are commanded to preserve indissoluble the sacred 
obligations of the marriage vow, by mutual concessions, and mutual 
forbearance” of husband and wife, each “bear[ing] an equal part in all the 
duties of the married state.”211 
But to build his natural law framework, Grotius was more interested in 
what the law of nature itself could teach us about sex, marriage, and family life 
independent of biblical norms and divine revelation.212 That was in part the 
challenge he set for himself by uttering his (in)famously impious hypothesis: 
that natural law would exist even if “we should concede that which cannot be 
conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the 
affairs of men are of no concern to Him.”213 It was the further challenge he set 
by his definition of natural law whose contents and commandments were to be 
rationally self-evident: 
The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out 
that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational 
nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and 
that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by 
the author of nature, God. 
The acts in regard to which such a dictate exists are, in 
themselves, either obligatory or not permissible, and so it is 
understood that necessarily they are enjoined or forbidden by God. In 
this characteristic the law of nature differs not only from human law, 
but also from volitional divine law . . . .214 
 
 208 See 2 GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 197, at 508–22. 
 209 See id. 
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When deliberated purely rationally, without the aid of the Bible or divine 
authorities, Grotius concluded, natural law confirms a number of traditional 
Christian teachings of sex, marriage, and family, but not all of them and not 
altogether clearly. Grotius insisted that the Bible does not prescribe or 
proscribe anything “which is not agreeable to natural Decorum.”215 But he 
further insisted that the “Laws of [Christ] do not oblige us” to conduct that 
goes well beyond “what the Law of Nature already require[s] of [us].”216 Those 
who believe that Scripture and nature command exactly the same conduct are 
fooling themselves, Grotius observed.217 They will be “strangely embarrassed” 
when they try “to prove, that certain [t]hings which are forbid[den] by the 
Gospel, as Concubinage, Divorce, [and] Polygamy, are likewise condemned by 
the Law of Nature.”218 While “[r]eason itself informs us that it is more Decent 
to refrain” from such deviations from faithful monogamous marriage, natural 
law does not necessarily prohibit them outright; that usually requires religious 
sanction and command.219 
With these distinctions in mind, Grotius began to sort through what 
features of traditional Christian marriage “Nature seem[s] to require” and what 
features are required only according to the Gospel.220 He sometimes was 
content simply to show the overlaps between Christian and “heathen” marital 
practices, evidently thinking this was proof enough of the natural qualities of 
these practices.221 “[T]he instances are numerous,” he wrote, “wherein 
heathens are observed to have inculcated, severally, the very same principles 
and duties, which are collectively enjoined by our [Christian] religion.”222 The 
heathens, he explained, teach that “the intentional adulterer is guilty of the 
actual sin of adultery; . . . that a man should be the husband of one wife; that 
the marriage-covenant should be inviolable.”223 
Grotius sometimes combined the common patterns of animals with the 
common customs of advanced civilizations to demonstrate what he thought 
was natural. For example, he condemned “[t]he promiscuous enjoyment of all 
women in common,” which some ancient peoples practiced and which even 
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Plato had commended in his Republic.224 Such practices would reduce the state 
to “one common brothel,” Grotius concluded.225 “[S]ome even of the brute 
animals” observe natural law far better, for they “are seen to observe a sort of 
conjugal obligation” at least in their production of offspring.226 “Far more just 
and reasonable it is, therefore, that man, the most excellent and most 
distinguished of all animals, should not be suffered to derive his origin from 
casual and uncertain parents, to the total extinction of those mutual ties, the 
filial and parental affections.”227 Observing the natural law, humans have thus 
learned to ensure the certainty of the bond between parents and children by 
tying procreation to enduring monogamous marriages so “that confusion of 
offspring may not arise.”228 And because of the long period of human infantile 
dependency, humans have further learned to treat monogamous marriage as a 
“real friendship,” “a perpetual and indissoluble union,” “a full participation 
and mutual conne[ct]ion both of soul and body.”229 
The superior advantage of this institution, in respect to the proper 
education of children, is a truth as obvious as undeniable. Monogamy 
was even the established custom of some particular Pagan nations; 
among the Germans, for example, and the Romans: and herein the 
Christians also follow their example, on a principle of justice, in 
repaying, on the part of the husband, the entire and undivided 
affection of the wife; while, at the same time, the regulations of 
domestic economy may be better preserved under one head and 
mistress of the family; and all those dissentions avoided which a 
diversity of mothers must create among the children.230 
Genesis 1 and 2 further confirm this natural preference for monogamous 
marriage, said Grotius, because “God gave to one Man one Woman only, it 
sufficiently appears what is best” for the marriages of the human race.231 
Grotius’s argument for monogamy, albeit cryptic, was a textbook 
restatement of the natural configuration of marriage expounded by Aquinas 
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and Vitoria.232 The gist of the argument, as he saw it, was that enduring and 
exclusive monogamous marriages were essential to ensuring parental certainty 
for their children.233 And parental certainty, particularly for the father, was 
essential so that parents would bond with their children who are born helpless 
and remain utterly dependent upon their parents for survival for many years.234 
Later Enlightenment writers took this argument as the starting point for their 
theories of marriage and the family. Commenting on Grotius, for example, the 
prolific German and Swedish jurist and historian, Samuel von Pufendorf 
(1632–1694), wrote that the reality of lengthy infant dependence gave humans 
a strong natural inclination toward exclusive and enduring marriages and a 
strong natural abhorrence to sex outside of marriage—even though “man is an 
animal always ready for the deed of love.”235 If natural law had not channeled 
this strong male sex drive toward marriage, and men were permitted to have 
random sex like “a cow [] in heat,” they would do nothing to help the mothers 
and children who need them.236 “[W]hat man would offer his support unless he 
were sure he was the father” of her child?237 “[W]hat man would undertake the 
care of any but his own offspring, whom it is not easy to pick out when such 
free license prevails?”238 Sex only within monogamous marriage was a natural 
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necessity for mankind and a natural duty for each man, Pufendorf concluded, 
later crediting Grotius for this insight.239 
While monogamy is the naturally preferred form of marriage and forum for 
sex, Grotius continued, he could not say that polygamy was automatically 
rendered void by the law of nature alone.240 After all, a number of animals, 
from chickens and cattle to lions and wolves, are polygamous and fare quite 
well. A number of successful biblical patriarchs and kings were polygamous, 
and no Old Testament law explicitly forbade them.241 A number of advanced 
civilizations like Muslims are polygamous, and they are strong.242 Grotius 
thought that polygamy was a reprehensible exploitation of women and an 
indulgence of a man’s “brutal appetite,”243 and he praised the institution of 
monogamous marriage taught by Christianity.244 But he concluded that it takes 
“the law of Christ” to condemn polygamy outright.245 While this argument 
convinced Pufendorf and other writers like Christian Thomasius and Baron 
Montesquieu in the next century,246 several eighteenth-century and 
nineteenth-century writers marshaled a strong natural law case against 
polygamy, as we shall see in a moment. 
Grotius had less trouble condemning polyandry—one woman with multiple 
husbands—as contrary to natural law.247 But he did so with a heavy-handed 
patriarchal argument that went beyond even the patriarchal conventions of his 
day. A marriage “contracted with a Woman, who already has a Husband, is 
void by the Law of Nature, unless her first Husband has divorced her; for till 
then his Property in her continues.”248 “[I]n its natural State,” Grotius 
explained, a marriage “puts the Woman, as it were, under the immediate 
Inspection and Guard of the Man: For we see, even among some Beasts, such a 
Sort of Society exists between the Male and Female.”249 In human marriages, 
too, “the Authority is not equal; the Husband is the Head of the Wife in all 
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conjugal and family Affairs; for the Wife becomes Part of the Husband’s 
Family, and it is but reasonable, that the Husband should have the Rule and 
Disposal of his own House.”250 The gist of this argument was that polygyny 
was unnatural because the natural law gives a man exclusive dominion over his 
wife’s person, property, and contracts—the common law doctrine of 
“coverture” now cast in general natural law terms.251 This argument not only 
contradicted Grotius’s starting premise that men and women have an equal and 
natural right to marry but it also made little sense. Men by nature share 
property and power all the time—else no civilization could ever emerge from 
the state of nature. Moreover, bees, ants, and other animals sometimes operate 
successfully with matriarchies: why should they count any less than a herd of 
cattle in describing the contents of natural law, especially since the orderliness 
of beehives served Grotius’s later arguments about the natural legal order. 
Later Enlightenment writers, beginning with John Locke, as we will see in a 
moment, rejected Grotius’s argument about polygyny, instead condemning this 
practice with more egalitarian natural law rationales.252 They also rejected 
Grotius’s further argument that the natural law permits fathers to sell, enslave, 
or lease their children.253 For most later Enlightenment writers, these 
arguments were just a thin natural law apologia for the traditional unlimited 
power of the paterfamilias at Roman law that had since been limited by civil 
law reforms. 
Grotius was considerably more nuanced and convincing in his treatment of 
what he called a “difficult, if not impossible” question: whether the natural law 
outlaws incest—sex with or marriage to a party related by blood or family 
ties.254 Biblical law and Roman law firmly outlawed incest, and both Catholics 
and Protestants wrote endlessly on this topic in their discussions of the 
impediments of consanguinity and affinity.255 There is a strong natural law 
argument against incest, too, said Grotius which supports at least some of these 
traditional legal prohibitions. It is the argument from natural revulsion.256 Even 
“dumb animals,” who operate only instinctually and “naturally,” simply avoid 
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sexual relations between parents and children, brothers and sisters—no matter 
how desperate their urge to mate.257 They are by nature repelled by such sexual 
connections.258 Among humans, reason translates this natural “aversion” to sex 
with close relatives into stronger terms of moral abhorrence as well.259 Unless 
they have “been corrupted by evil education,” or are simply crazy, most people 
have an automatic and visceral “revulsion” against such close sexual unions, 
Grotius wrote.260 They see them as “contrary to the law of nature”—not only 
impure and immodest but an outright “crime” and corruption of their rational 
nature.261 Moreover, such close relations confuse natural family roles.262 How 
can a father marry his daughter, or a mother her son, when they already have a 
complete, and lifelong relationship of parent and child? How can a child, who 
must always remain subordinate to the parent, become that parent’s spouse, or 
even her head, through marriage? Also, to allow parents and children and 
brothers and sisters who daily share the same household to have sex together 
will “pave the way to unchastity and adultery, if such loves could be cemented 
in marriage.”263 Sex or marriage between close relatives is contrary to human 
nature and contrary to the laws of nature that govern humans.264 This insight 
anticipated an “inhibitory mechanism” that modern scientists call the revulsion 
reflex against incest, which humans evidently share with other higher 
primates.265 
Most civilizations, Grotius showed, used similar logic to extend the 
category of incest to ban sexual and marital relations with other near relatives 
as well, even if “those prohibitions do not come from the pure law of nature” 
alone.266 While brute animals couple with more distant relatives, rational 
humans do not.267 The three layers of consanguinity and affinity set out in the 
Mosaic law have parallels in many other legal cultures, both before and after 
the time of Moses.268 Grotius adduced dozens of Jewish, Greek, Roman, and 
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Christian writers who condemned incest, even if they differed on exactly 
where to draw the line between distant relatives.269 Incest prohibitions and 
aversions are so commonplace among men, Grotius concluded that “there must 
have been some Law that prohibited them” either “given by [God] . . . to all 
Mankind” or “derived from an invincible Impression of the Light of 
Nature.”270 
Grotius’s natural law argument against incest became a standard among 
Western jurists and moralists. Many of them cited natural repugnance and 
inherent revulsion as the strongest indicators that incest of some sort was 
against the natural law.271 Others added utilitarian arguments about bettering 
the breed of mankind by mixing blood lines and about enlarging friendships in 
the world by alliances formed by marriages between unrelated parties.272 Most 
Enlightenment writers agreed with the English judge, Richard Cumberland 
(1631–1718), who said that “all the Laws in Scripture against Incest are, not 
[absolute], but in a degree and measure, greater or lesser, Laws of Nature, or 
Branches of the Law of Nature . . . [for] doing otherwise is ordinarily in the 
Nature of the Thing an Incongruity.”273 But most also agreed with influential 
French philosopher, Baron Montesquieu (1689–1755), who wrote that, with 
incest as with other marriage and family norms, “it is a thing extremely 
delicate to fix exactly the point at which the laws of nature stop and where the 
civil laws begin.”274 For the reality is that “[i]t has happened in all ages and 
countries, that religion has been blended with marriages. When certain things 
have been considered as impure or unlawful, and [have] nevertheless become 
necessary, they were obliged to call in religion to legitimate in the one case, 
and to reprove in others.”275 But in this day of contested religious claims, 
Montesquieu continued, the critical question is whether there are alternative 
norms and auxiliary expedients, besides religion, that can channel nature or 
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school natural inclinations in the direction of exclusive and enduring 
monogamous marriages between unrelated men and women with the fitness 
and capacity to marry each other.276 
Defining more clearly the point at which the natural laws of marriage and 
family start and stop was one challenge Grotius left for later Enlightenment 
writers. Defining more fully what else nature teaches about many other 
features of traditional marriage and family not treated fully by Grotius was a 
further challenge. A large number of Enlightenment writers took up these 
challenges in developing a natural law of marriage, often as part of a broader 
theory of natural law and the law of nations (ius gentium). Hundreds of 
writings on point have survived from the seventeenth through nineteenth 
centuries. Among English writers, the best and most original such reflections 
on the nature of marriage and the family came from political philosopher John 
Locke,277 the utilitarian philosopher William Paley,278 the early feminist 
philosopher Mary Wollstonecraft,279 and the Cambridge jurist Thomas 
Rutherforth.280 Among Germans, the most prolific natural law writer on 
marriage was Samuel von Pufendorf281 (whose work together with that of 
Grotius was popularized in Europe and America by the Genevan jurist Jean 
Jacques Burlamaqui) as well as the German jurists Johannes Wolfgang 
Textor282 and Christian Thomasius.283 Among Scottish Enlightenment figures, 
the most influential writings were by Gershon Carmichael,284 David  
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Fordyce,285 John Millar,286 Francis Hutcheson,287 Adam Smith,288 and Henry 
Home.289 A solid intellectual history and analysis of all these early modern 
Enlightenment writings on marriage and the family remains to be written: it 
will be a large treatise if done comprehensively. Let’s just sample a few of 
these writings to show the power, creativity, and comprehensiveness of these 
arguments about the nature of marriage and the family, and then show how 
they were woven into the Anglo-American common law of marriage in the 
later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
III. JOHN LOCKE, MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, AND THE EMERGING LIBERAL 
NATURAL LAW OF MARRIAGE 
A. John Locke 
In his famous Two Treatises of Government, John Locke (1632–1704), 
pressed a natural law and natural rights argument for marriage and family life 
that was cast in more liberal and egalitarian terms than that of Grotius.290 
Locke, in fact, designed his theory of marriage to refute the patriarchal theories 
of his fellow Englishman, Robert Filmer.291 In his Patriarcha (c. 1638), Filmer 
argued that God had created the patriarchal domestic commonwealth, headed 
by the paterfamilias, as the source of the hierarchical political commonwealth 
headed by the king.292 God had created Adam and Eve as founders not only of 
the first marriage and family but also of the first state and society.293 Adam 
was the first husband but also the first ruler.294 Eve was the first wife but also 
the first subject.295 Together with their children, they comprised at once a 
 
 285 See DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THREE BOOKS WITH A BRIEF 
ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE, PROGRESS, AND ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY 81–88 (Thomas Kennedy ed., Liberty 
Fund 2003) (1754). 
 286 See JOHN MILLAR, THE ORIGIN OF THE DISTINCTION OF RANKS: OR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH GIVE RISE TO THE INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY, IN THE DIFFERENT MEMBERS OF 
SOCIETY 47–66, 109–39 (Aaron Garrett ed., Liberty Fund 2006) (1771). 
 287 See infra notes 436–44. 
 288 See SMITH, supra note 271, at 141–71. 
 289 See infra Part IV.A. 
 290 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 162–69 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2d ed. 1967) (1689). 
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domestic and a political commonwealth.296 All persons thereafter were, by 
birth, subject to the highest male head, descended from Adam.297 
Locke responded to Filmer first by flatly denying any natural or necessary 
connection between the political and domestic commonwealths, between the 
authority of the paterfamilias and that of the magistrate.298 “[T]he Power of a 
Magistrate over a Subject,” he wrote, “may be distinguished from that of a 
Father over his Children, a Master over his Servant, a Husband over his Wife, 
and a Lord over his Slave.”299 The “little Common-wealth” of the family is 
“very far from” the great commonwealth in England “in its Constitution, 
Power and End.”300 “[T]he Master of the Family has a very distinct and 
differently limited Power, both as to time and extent, over those several 
Persons that are in it; . . . he has no Legislative Power of Life and Death over 
any of them, and none too but what a Mistress of a Family may have as well as 
he.”301 
Locke responded next by denying Filmer’s patriarchal interpretation of the 
creation story in Genesis. God did not create Adam and Eve as ruler and 
subject, but as husband and wife, said Locke.302 Adam and Eve were created 
equal before God: “Male and female created he them.”303 Each had natural 
rights to use the bounties of Paradise.304 Each had natural duties to each other 
and to God.305 After the fall into sin, God expelled Adam and Eve from 
Paradise.306 He increased man’s labor in his use of creation.307 He increased 
woman’s labor in the bearing of children.308 He said to Eve: “thy desire shall 
be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.”309 These words, which Locke 
noted Filmer had called “the Original Grant of Government” were “not spoken 
to Adam, neither indeed was there any Grant in them made to Adam, but a 
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Punishment laid upon Eve.”310 These words do not abrogate the natural 
equality, rights, and duties with which God created Adam and Eve, and all 
persons after them.311 They do not render all wives eternally subject to their 
husbands.312 And they certainly do not, as Filmer insisted, give “a Father or a 
Prince . . . an Absolute, Arbitrary, Unlimited and Unlimitable Power, over the 
Lives, Liberties, and Estates of his Children and Subjects.”313 
Men and women were born free and equal in the state of nature, Locke 
argued.314 But “[God] having made Man such a Creature, that, in his own 
Judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong 
Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination to drive him into 
Society.”315 “The first Society” to be formed after the state of nature “was 
between Man and Wife, which gave beginning to that between Parents and 
Children.”316 This “Conjugal Society,” like every other society 
is made by a voluntary Compact between Man and Woman: and tho’ 
it consist chiefly in such a Communion and Right in one anothers 
Bodies, as is necessary to its chief End, Procreation; yet it draws with 
it mutual Support, and Assistance, and Communion of Interest too, as 
necessary not only to unite their Care, and Affection, but also 
necessary to their common Off-spring, who have a Right to be 
nourished and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for 
themselves.317 
Marriage has no necessary form or function beyond this “chief End” of 
procreation, Locke argued against traditional understandings.318 Couples were 
free to contract about the rest of the relationship as they deemed fit: 
Conjugal Society, might be varied and regulated by that Contract, 
which unites Man and Wife in that Society, as far as may consist with 
Procreation and the bringing up of Children till they could shift for 
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themselves; nothing being necessary to any Society, that is not 
necessary to the ends for which it is made.319 
Locke thus grounded marriage and the family in a set of natural rights and 
duties. It was a natural right for a man and woman to enter into a marital 
contract. It was a natural duty for them to render procreation an essential 
condition of whatever marital contract they entered. It was a natural condition 
of children to be born helpless and thus a natural right for them to be nurtured, 
educated, and raised to maturity by the parents who conceived them. This 
triggered the natural duty of their parents to remain together in marriage in 
order to raise their children. Locke advanced an argument about the role of 
long-term infant dependency in marriage formation that was strikingly similar 
to one put forth by Thomas Aquinas: 
For the end of conjunction between Male and Female, being not 
barely Procreation, but the continuation of the Species, this 
conjunction betwixt Male and Female ought to last, even after 
Procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of 
the young Ones, who are to be sustained by those that got them, till 
they are able to shift and provide for themselves. . . . [W]hereby the 
Father; who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under an 
Obligation to continue in Conjugal Society with the same Woman 
longer than other Creatures, whose Young being able to subsist of 
themselves, before the time of Procreation returns again, the 
Conjugal Bond dissolves of it self, and they are at liberty . . . .320 
The logical end of Locke’s argument was that childless couples, or couples 
whose children were of age and on their own, should be free to divorce, unless 
they had found some other “Communion of Interest” to sustain their 
marriage.321 Locke dithered on the question of divorce. It was not essential to 
his argument to speak definitively on the subject, and he knew the dangers of 
loose literary speculation on it given the heated English politics of his day. In 
his private diary, he wrote quite brashly: “He that is already married may 
marry another woman with his left hand. . . . The ties, duration, and conditions 
of the left hand marriage shall be no other than what is expressed in the 
contract of marriage between the parties’.”322 In his Two Treatises and other 
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publications, however, he only flirted with the doctrine of divorce and 
remarriage, suggesting delicately that the matter be left to private contractual 
calculation.323 
Another logical end of Locke’s argument was that polygamy was a 
violation of the natural rights of wives and children and a violation of the 
natural equality of husband and wife within the marital estate. Locke did not 
say this clearly either, though the arguments for polygamy were pressing in his 
day.324 He said obliquely that polygamy was not a proper “moral relation” 
because it compromised a man’s “readiness to acknowledge and return 
kindness received,” including presumably from his wife and children.325 He 
suggested that polygamy, like other forms of promiscuity, was a “sin.”326 He 
said more explicitly that a guarantee of liberty of conscience and religious 
toleration did not prevent the state from punishing “the Dishonesty and 
Debauchery of Mens lives”—which, for Locke, included “arbitrary Divorce, 
Polygamy, Concubinage, simple Fornication,” adultery, and incest.327 These 
sexual “immoralities,” said Locke, cannot “be exempt from the magistrate’s 
power of punishing” them just because their proponents happen to call them 
“articles of faith, or ways of worship.”328 Polygamy, like incest, adultery, and 
the like are simply wrong, said Locke, and must be prohibited without 
exception, religious liberty notwithstanding.329 This echoed Locke’s earlier 
statement that polygamy and divorce are not so much matters of religion or 
conscience but “things either of indifference or doubt”330 —the “adiaphora” or 
unessentials of the faith. A magistrate may limit or prohibit these activities to 
protect “the welfare and safety of his people” and to avoid the “greater 
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inconveniences than advantages to the community” that these activities 
occasion.331 
[A] toleration of men in all that which they pretend out of conscience 
they cannot submit to, will wholly take away all the civil laws and all 
the magistrate’s power, and so there will be no law, nor government, 
if you deny the magistrate’s authority in indifferent things, over 
which it is acknowledged on all hands that he has jurisdiction.332 
This was an early statement of an important argument about the proper and 
necessary limits of religious freedom and human rights claims to practice 
polygamy. This argument for such limitations would grow in the Western legal 
tradition, especially in nineteenth-century America, to reject the claims of 
religious polygamists who claimed religious freedom exemptions from general 
criminal laws prohibiting polygamy.333 Locke saw this religious freedom 
argument for polygamy exemptions looming already in the later seventeenth 
century, and he cut it off cleanly. 
A final logical end of Locke’s argument was that church and state had little 
role to play within marriage and the family. The church was a voluntary 
assembly of like-minded believers who could enjoy only those powers that its 
members had collectively delegated to it.334 No man has power over another’s 
marriage, and thus the church had no delegated power over marriage that it can 
ever exercise.335 The state likewise was a voluntary assembly, formed by a 
governmental contract among like-minded parties who agreed to become 
citizens.336 The state was formed after marriage and the family, and was 
ultimately subordinate to it in priority and right.337 The private marriage 
contract—that preceded any public government or private church contract—
sets the basic terms of the agreement between husband and wife, parent and 
child, in accordance with the laws and rights of nature.338 The church could 
intervene only at the invitation of the parties.339 The state could intervene only 
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to enforce these contractual rights and duties, and only to vindicate the natural 
rights and duties of each party within the household.340 
For all the ends of Marriage being to be obtained under Politick 
Government, as well as in the state of Nature, the Civil Magistrate 
doth not abridge the Right, or Power of either naturally necessary to 
those ends, viz. Procreation and mutual Support and Assistance whilst 
they are together; but only decides any Controversie that may arise 
between Man and Wife about them.341 
Locke did not press this idea of private marital contracts to revolutionary 
conclusions. He was a man of pious Puritan upbringing, and he held to 
traditional biblical teachings throughout his life, even though he later shed 
some of the more rigorous Anglo-Puritan conventions of his youth.342 His 
famous Letters on Toleration and The Reasonableness of Christianity were 
tracts of deep Christian conviction.343 In each of these writings, Locke called 
on church and state to end their unhealthy alliances, to soften their belligerent 
dogmatism, and to return to the simple moral truths of the Bible.344 In each of 
these tracts, as well as in a series of glosses on the books of the New 
Testament, he insisted on coating his doctrine of natural rights and duties with 
a number of classic Christian teachings.345 These included the biblical 
injunctions to heterosexuality, monogamy, procreation, nurture and education 
of children, respect for the conjugal debt, and maintenance of healthy marital 
sex lives.346 They also included biblical prohibitions on fornication, adultery, 
lust, prostitution, polygamy, “causeless divorce,” and more.347 Like Grotius, 
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Locke thought ultimately that natural and biblical teachings on sex, marriage, 
and family life largely converged, even though the Bible was more demanding. 
“[H]e that shall collect all the moral rules of the philosophers, and compare 
them with those contained in the New Testament,” he wrote, “will find them to 
come short of the morality delivered by our Saviour, and taught by his 
apostles” that the “law of morality Jesus Christ hath given us in the New 
Testament . . . [is] a full and sufficient rule for our direction, and conformable 
to that of reason.”348 
Locke’s writings had a monumental impact on later Enlightenment 
philosophers and jurists. In France, Baron Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Marquis de Condorcet, François Voltaire, and many others cited and 
quoted Locke’s writings with reverence, including notably his discussions of 
marriage and the family.349 Montesquieu, in particular, echoed and elaborated 
Locke’s marital theories at length in his Spirit of the Laws, an anchor text for 
law, politics, and philosophy on both sides of the Atlantic for the next two 
centuries.350 In America, John Adams, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and 
many others took Locke’s marital and broader political theories as axiomatic, 
and wove them (and Montesquieu’s elaboration of them) into their political 
writings and into the family laws of the young American republic.351 And, in 
England especially, Locke’s writings were the anchor text for a century of 
brilliant advances in legal, political, and social philosophy, albeit with ever 
greater focus on reason and nature instead of Scripture and tradition.352 
Particularly influential was Locke’s image of the marital contract as the first 
contract that humans formed as they proceeded from the state of nature in 
order to form a society dedicated to the preservation of their natural rights and 
liberties. 
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B. Mary Wollstonecraft 
To illustrate, let me just focus on one influential example, the work of early 
feminist critic and educator Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797). In her famous 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft pushed Locke’s premises 
further in support of the natural rights of women within and beyond the 
home.353 Notwithstanding Locke’s efforts, Wollstonecraft argued, traditional 
patriarchal ideas continue to perpetuate the idea that “woman must be inferior 
to man, and made for him.”354 It treats a woman as a mere pretty, demur, and 
passive “toy of man,” to be shaken and rattled “whenever, dismissing reason, 
he chooses to be amused,” though inevitably he will grow tired of this one toy, 
especially when it becomes worn or damaged, and he will acquire another and 
then another either at the same time or seriatim after divorce.355 It measures a 
woman’s value and virtue in society merely by her physical beauty, by her 
fecundity, by her capacity to bear and raise children.356 It says to a woman that 
her main vocation in life is this: to “procreate and rot.”357 
Wollstonecraft took sharp aim at the common law system of her day, which 
still perpetuated traditional patriarchal forms where husbands ruled their wives 
without check or restriction and confined them to procreation and menial 
household duties. “The divine right of husbands, like the divine right of kings, 
may, it is to be hoped, in this enlightened age, be contested without danger,” 
she wrote.358 We cannot be seduced by “the same arguments that tyrannic[al] 
kings and venal ministers have used, and fallaciously assert that woman ought 
to be subjected because she has always been so.”359 Custom is not nature, and 
the long habit of penning and domesticating women in a “gilt[ed] cage,” does 
not make it right.360 Men have their “natural freedom,” rights, and dignity.361 
Women do too. “It is time to effect a revolution in female manners—time to 
restore to them their lost dignity—and make them, as a part of the human 
species, labour by reforming themselves to reform the world.”362 
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The reform of the world that Wollstonecraft had in mind was for men and 
women to be treated equally in private and public life and, given the education 
and opportunity, to develop their minds and capacities to fit their native talents. 
Men might be stronger in body on average, and women might have more 
capacity and thus responsibility in the production and nursing of infant 
children, Wollstonecraft allowed.363 And that might suggest different roles 
within the public and private spheres for a time and different training to 
prepare for the unique vocation of motherhood.364 “But I still insist, not only 
the virtue, but the knowledge of the two sexes should be the same in nature,” 
Wollstonecraft argued, “and that women, considered not only as moral, but 
rational creatures, . . . [should] acquire human virtues . . . by the same means as 
men, instead of being educated like a fanciful kind of half being.”365 She 
added, “Liberty is the mother of virtue, and if women be, by their very 
constitution, slaves, and not allowed to breathe the sharp invigorating air of 
freedom, they must ever languish like exotics, and be reckoned beautiful flaws 
in nature.”366 
If a woman is given the freedom and education to develop her full capacity 
of reason, virtue, and character, Wollstonecraft insisted, the marriage and 
family life that she chooses to enter will be so much better.367 The marriage 
will be a union of “equal moral beings,” a “dyadic perfectionist friendship”368 
between partners who can sustain and support each other throughout a lifetime. 
A properly educated woman will make a true friend and partner to her 
husband, and not just a sexual plaything while they are newlyweds, a useful 
mother as children grow up, but then a dispensable burden to her husband 
when beauty, sex, and children are no longer the priority.369 She will also make 
a much better mother, teacher, and role model for their children, preparing 
them properly to rise to their full potential and contribution: 
Contending for the rights of woman, my main argument is built 
on this simple principle, that if she be not prepared by education to 
become the companion of man, she will stop the progress of 
knowledge and virtue; for truth must be common to all, or it will be 
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inefficacious with respect to its influence on general practice. And 
how can woman be expected to co-operate unless she know why she 
ought to be virtuous? unless freedom strengthen her reason till she 
comprehend her duty, and see in what manner it is connected with 
her real good? If children are to be educated to understand the true 
principle of patriotism, their mother must be a patriot; and the love of 
mankind, from which an orderly train of virtues spring, can only be 
produced by considering the moral and civil interest of mankind; but 
the education and situation of woman, at present, shuts her out from 
such investigations.370 
IV. HENRY HOME AND SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT TEACHINGS ON SEX, 
MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY 
A number of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers also endorsed Locke’s 
views, but they also pushed beyond him in developing their natural law 
theories of sex, marriage, and family life. They accepted Locke’s theories of 
egalitarian monogamy and of the natural rights and duties within the household 
between husband and wife, parent and child. But these Scottish writers worked 
hard to show the deeper natural foundations of exclusive and enduring 
monogamous marriages and the need for liberal societies to maintain most 
traditional sex crimes. 
A. Henry Home 
The writings of Henry Home (1696–1782), known as Lord Kames of 
Scotland, were particularly perceptive.371 A leading man of letters and a 
leading justice of Scotland’s highest court, Home was a friend of Francis 
Hutcheson, David Hume, Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, and other such Scottish 
luminaries.372 He wrote extensively on law and politics, religion and morality, 
history and economy, art and industry.373 He was best known for his brilliant 
defense of natural law, principally on empirical and rational grounds.374 Home 
sought to prove the realities of virtue, duty, justice, liberty, freedom, and other 
natural moral principles, and the necessity for rational humans to create 
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various offices, laws, and institutions to support and protect them.375 While his 
rationalist methodology and naturalist theology rankled the orthodox Christian 
theologians of his day, Home wanted to give his natural law argument a more 
universal and enduring cogency. A devout and lifelong Protestant, he believed 
in the truth of Scripture and the will of God.376 But he wanted to win over even 
skeptics and atheists to his legal and moral arguments and to give enduring 
“authority to promises and covenants” that helped create society and its 
institutions.377 
Among many other institutions and “covenants,” Home defended 
monogamous marriage as a necessity of nature, and he denounced polygamy as 
a “vice against [human] nature.”378 Home recognized, of course, that polygamy 
was commonplace among some animals, drawing sundry examples from the 
work of French Jesuit naturalist Buffon.379 He also recognized that polygamy 
had been practiced in early Western history and was still known in some 
Islamic and Asiatic cultures in his day.380 But, Home insisted, polygamy exists 
only “where women are treated as inferior beings,” and where “men of wealth 
transgress every rule of temperance” by buying their wives like slaves and by 
adopting the “savage manners” of animals.381 Among horses, cattle, and other 
grazing animals, he argued, polygamy is natural.382 One superior male breeds 
with all females, and the mothers take care of their own young who grow 
quickly independent.383 For these animals, monogamous “pairing would be of 
no use: the female feeds herself and her young at the same instant; and nothing 
is left for the male to do.”384 But other animals, such as nesting birds, “whose 
young require the nursing care of both parents, are directed by nature to pair” 
and to remain paired till their young “are sufficiently vigorous to provide for 
themselves.”385 
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Humans are the latter sort of creature, said Home, for whom pairing and 
parenting are indispensable.386 Humans are thus inclined by nature toward 
enduring monogamous pairing of parents—indeed, more so than any other 
creature given the long fragility and helplessness of their offspring.387 Home 
expanded on the natural configuration of marriage and the importance of 
human childhood dependency developed by Aquinas and Vitoria, and he added 
new insights as well from the science of cultural development (anthropology as 
we now call it): 
Man is an animal of long life, and is proportionally slow in growing 
to maturity: he is a helpless being before the age of fifteen or sixteen; 
and there may be in a family ten or twelve children of different births, 
before the eldest can shift for itself. Now in the original state of 
hunting and fishing, which are laborious occupations, and not always 
successful, a woman, suckling her infant, is not able to provide food 
even for herself, far less for ten or twelve voracious children. . . . 
[P]airing, is so necessary to the human race, that it must be natural 
and instinctive. . . . Brute animals which do not pair, have grass and 
other food in plenty, enabling the female to feed her young without 
needing any assistance from the male. But where the young require 
the nursing care of both parents, pairing is a law of nature.388 
Not only is the pairing of male and female a law of nature, Home 
continued, but “[m]atrimony is instituted by nature” to overcome humans’ 
greatest natural handicap to effective procreation and preservation as a 
species—their perpetual desire for sex, especially among the young, at exactly 
the time when they are most fertile.389 Unlike most animals, whose sexual 
appetites are confined to short rutting seasons, Home wrote, humans have a 
constant sexual appetite, which, by nature, “demands gratification, after short 
intervals.”390 If men and women just had random sex with anyone—“like the 
hart in rutting time”—the human race would devolve into a “savage state” of 
nature and soon die out.391 Men would make perennial and “promiscuous use 
of women” and not commit themselves to the care of these women or their 
children.392 “[W]omen would in effect be common prostitutes.”393 Few women 
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would have the ability on their own “to provide food for a family of children,” 
and most would avoid having children or would abandon them if they did.394 
Marriage is nature’s safeguard against such proclivities, said Home, and 
“frequent enjoyment” of marital sex and intimacy “endears a pair to each 
other,” making them want only each other all the more.395 “Sweet is the society 
of a pair fitted for each other, in whom are collected the affections of husband, 
wife, lover, friend, the tenderest affections of human nature.”396 
The God of nature has [thus] enforced conjugal society, not only 
by making it agreeable, but by the principle of chastity inherent in 
our nature. To animals that have no instinct for pairing, chastity is 
utterly unknown; and to them it would be useless. The mare, the cow, 
the ewe, the she-goat, receive the male without ceremony, and admit 
the first that comes in the way without distinction. Neither have tame 
fowl any notion of chastity: they pair not; and the female gets no food 
from the male, even during incubation. But chastity and mutual 
fidelity are . . . . essential to the human race; enforced by the principle 
of chastity, a branch of the moral sense. Chastity is essential even to 
the continuation of the human race. As the carnal appetite is always 
alive, the sexes would wallow in pleasure, and be soon rendered unfit 
for procreation, were it not for the restraint of chastity.397 
Polygamy violates this natural design and strategy for successful 
procreation through enduring marital cohabitation, Home argued.398 First, 
monogamy is better suited to the roughly equal numbers of men and women in 
the world.399 “All men are by nature equal in rank: no man is privileged above 
another to have a wife; and therefore polygamy is contradictory” to the natural 
order and to the natural right of each fit adult to marry.400 Monogamous pairing 
is most “clearly the voice of nature.”401 It is echoed in “sacred scripture” in its 
injunction that two—not three or four—shall become “one flesh” in 
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marriage.402 If God and nature had intended to condone polygamy, there would 
be many more females than males.403 
Second, monogamy “is much better calculated for continuing the race, than 
the union of one man with many women.”404 One man cannot possibly provide 
food, care, and nurture to the many children born of his many wives.405 Their 
wives are not able to provide easily for their young when they are weakened 
from child labor and birth, needed for nursing, or distracted by the many needs 
of multiple children.406 Some of their children will be neglected, some will 
grow up impoverished, malnourished, or undereducated, some will inevitably 
die.407 “How much better chance for life have infants who are distributed more 
equally in different families.”408 
Third, monogamy is better suited for women.409 Men and women are by 
nature equal, Home argued at length, building on the egalitarian themes of 
Locke, among others.410 Monogamous marriage is naturally designed to 
respect this natural gender equality, even while recognizing the different roles 
that a husband and wife play in the procreation and nurture of their children.411 
Thus marriage works best when a husband and wife have “reciprocal and 
equal” affection as true “companion[s]” in life, who enjoy each other and their 
children with “endear[ment]” and “constancy.”412 Polygamy, by contrast, is 
simply a patriarchal fraud.413 Each wife is reduced to a servant, “a mere 
instrument of pleasure and propagation” for her husband.414 Each wife is 
reduced to competing for the attention and affection of her husband, 
particularly if she has small children and needs help in their care.415 One wife 
and her children will inevitably be singled out for special favor, denigrating the 
others further and exacerbating the tensions within the household, which cause 
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the children to suffer, too.416 Packs of wolves might thrive this way, but 
rational humans cannot.417 Combining natural instinct with rational reflection, 
humans have discovered that monogamy is the “foundation for a matrimonial 
covenant” between two equal adults.418 
Fourth, monogamy is better designed to promote the fidelity and chastity 
humans need to procreate effectively as a species.419 It induces husband and 
wife to remain faithful to each other and to their children, come what may.420 
Polygamy, by contrast, is simply a forum and a catalyst for adultery and lust.421 
If a husband is allowed to satisfy his lust for a second woman whom he can 
add as a wife, his “one act of incontinence” will lead “to others without 
end.”422 Soon enough, he will lust after yet another wife and still another—
even the wife of another man, as the biblical story of King David’s lust for 
Bathsheba tragically illustrates.423 The husband’s bed-hopping, in turn, will 
“alienat[e] [the] affection[s]” of his first wife, who will embark on her own 
bed-hopping.424 Such “unlawful love” will only trigger more and more rivalries 
among husbands, wives, and lovers in which all will suffer.425 Moreover, by 
sharing another man’s bed, the wife might well require her husband “to 
maintain and educate children who are not his own.”426 This most men will not 
do unless they are uncommonly smitten or charitable.427 Polygamy simply does 
not work, Home concluded.428 “Matrimony between a single pair, for mutual 
comfort, and for procreating children, implies the strictest mutual fidelity.”429 
Even children understand that faithful monogamous marriage is “an 
appointment of nature,” Home concluded.430 As infants they bond with both 
their mothers and fathers and when they grow older they work to keep the 
couple together.431 “If undisguised nature show[s] itself any where, it is in 
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children,” Home wrote.432 “They often hear, it is true, people talking of 
matrimony;” Home continued, “but they also hear of logical, metaphysical, and 
commercial matters, without understanding a syllable. Whence then their 
notion of marriage but from nature? Marriage is a compound idea, which no 
instruction could bring within the comprehension of a child, did not nature 
cooperate.”433 From the mouths of babes come profound truths about our most 
basic institution.434 We hear in these words of Home the echoes of a children’s 
right point of view that Locke had introduced and later theorists would expand: 
the natural right of the child to be born in a society whose customs, 
institutions, and laws protect their inclination, need, and right to be raised by 
their parents of conception unless illness, accident, or death of a parent 
intervenes.435 
B. Francis Hutcheson and David Hume 
Home’s argument for monogamy and against polygamy was typical of the 
arguments from nature, reason, and experience that the Scottish Enlightenment 
mustered in favor of traditional forms and norms of marriage. Some of these 
writers supplemented these with arguments from Scripture and Christian 
tradition, but most, like Home, sought to prove their case on rational and 
empirical grounds so much as possible. For example, the great Scottish 
philosopher of common sense, Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), who proved so 
influential in America through the instruction of Princeton University President 
John Witherspoon,436 grounded his argument for the natural law of monogamy, 
fidelity, and exclusivity again on the natural needs of mothers and children: 
Now as the mothers are quite insufficient alone for this necessary and 
laborious task, which nature also has plainly enjoined on both the 
parents by implanting in both that strong parental affection; both 
parents are bound to concur in it, with joint labor, and united cares 
for a great share of their lives: and this can never be tolerable to them 
unless they are previously united in love and stable friendship: as 
new children also must be coming into life, prolonging this joint 
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charge. To engage mankind more cheerfully in this laborious service 
nature has implanted vehement affections between the sexes; excited 
not so much by views of brutal pleasure[,] . . . as by some 
appearances of virtues, displayed in their behavior, and even by their 
very form and countenances. These strong impulses plainly sh[o]w it 
to be the intention of nature that human offspring should be 
propagated only by parents first united in stable friendship, and in a 
firm covenant about perpetual cohabitation and joint care of their 
common children. For all true friendship aims at perpetuity: there’s 
no friendship in a bond only for a fixed term of years, or in one 
depending upon certain events which the utmost fidelity of the parties 
cannot ensure.437 
“[N]ature has [thus] strongly recommended” that for humans all sex and 
procreation occur within a “proper covenant about a friendly society for life,” 
Hutcheson continued.438 “The chief articles in this covenant are” mutual 
fidelity of husband and wife to each other.439 A wandering wife causes the 
“greatest injury” to her husband by bringing adulterine children into the home 
who dilute his property and distract him from “that tender affection which is 
naturally due only to his own [children].”440 A wandering husband causes great 
injury to his wife and children by allowing his affections and fortunes to be 
squandered on prostitutes, mistresses, and lovers.441 Other articles of the 
natural marital covenant, Hutcheson wrote, include “a perpetual union of 
interests and pursuits” between husband and wife, a mutual commitment to 
“the right education of their common children,” and a mutual agreement to 
forgo separation and divorce.442 It is against reason and human nature, 
Hutcheson wrote, “to divorce or separate from a faithful and affectionate 
consort for any causes which include no moral turpitude; such as barrenness, or 
infirmity of body; or any mournful accident which no mortal could prevent.”443 
Divorce should be allowed only in cases of adultery, “obstinate desertion, 
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capital enmity, or hatred and such gross outrages as take away all hopes of any 
friendly society for the future or a safe and agreeable life together.”444 
Similarly, the famous Scottish philosopher, David Hume (1711–1776), for 
all his skepticism about traditional Christian morality, thought traditional legal 
and moral norms of sex, marriage, and family life to be both natural and useful. 
Hume summarized the natural configuration of marriage crisply: “The long 
and helpless infancy requires the combination of parents for the subsistence of 
their young; and that combination requires the virtue of chastity or fidelity to 
the marriage bed.”445 Hume used many of the same arguments that Home had 
mustered against polygamy. This “odious” institution denied the natural 
equality of the sexes.446 It fostered “[t]he bad education of children.”447 It led 
to “jealousy” and competition among wives, and more.448 Moreover, said 
Hume, polygamy forced a man, distracted by his other wives and children, to 
confine his other wives to the home—by physically threatening, binding, or 
even laming them; by isolating them from society; or by keeping them so poor 
and weak they could not leave.449 All this is a form of “Barbarism,” with 
“frightful effects” that defy all nature and reason.450 
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Hume offered similar natural and utilitarian arguments against voluntary 
divorce.451 Many in Hume’s day argued for divorce as a natural expression of 
the freedom of contract and a natural compensation for having no recourse to 
polygamy despite a man’s natural drive to multiple partners.452 “The heart of 
man delights in liberty,” their argument went; “[t]he very image of constraint is 
grievous to it.”453 Hume would have none of this. To be sure, he recognized 
that divorce was sometimes the better of two evils—especially where one party 
was guilty of adultery, severe cruelty, or malicious desertion, and especially 
when no children were involved.454 But, outside of such narrow circumstances, 
he said, “nature has made [] divorce” without real cause the “doom [of] all 
mortals.”455 
First, with voluntary divorce, the children suffer and become 
“miserable.”456 Shuffled from home to home, consigned to the care of strangers 
and stepparents “instead of the fond attention and concern of a parent,” the 
inconveniences and encumbrances of their lives just multiply as the divorces of 
their parents and stepparents multiply.457 Second, when voluntary divorce is 
foreclosed, couples by nature become disinclined to wander and instead form 
“a calm and sedate affection, conducted by reason and cemented by habit; 
springing from long acquaintance and mutual obligations, without jealousies or 
fears.”458 “We need not, therefore, be afraid of drawing the marriage-knot, 
which chiefly subsists by friendship, the closest possible.”459 Third, “nothing is 
more dangerous than to unite two persons so closely in all their interests and 
concerns, as man and wife, without rendering the union entire and total.”460 
“The least possibility of a separate interest must be the source of endless 
quarrels and suspicions.”461 Nature, justice and prudence alike require their 
continued consortium.462 
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V. WILLIAM PALEY AND THE UTILITARIANS 
The natural law writings of Cambridge philosopher, William Paley (1743–
1805) provide a good illustration of how these natural law arguments could be 
pressed into a more utilitarian and natural rights direction.463 Paley was known 
in his day as a “theological utilitarian[].”464 He sought to define those natural 
principles and practices of social life that most conduce to human happiness—
in this life and in the next.465 Those principles and practices, he said, could be 
variously sought in Scripture and tradition, divine law and natural law, 
morality and casuistry—all of which, for Paley, contributed and came to “the 
same thing; namely, that science which teaches men their duty and the reasons 
of it.”466 
Marriage is among the natural duties and rights of men and women, Paley 
wrote, for it provides a variety of public and private goods.467 His list of 
marital goods was a nice distillation of traditional arguments: 
1. The private comfort of individuals, especially of the female 
sex . . . . 
2. The production of the greatest number of healthy children, their 
better education, and the making of due provision for their settlement 
in life. 
3. The peace of human society, in cutting off a principal source of 
contention, by assigning one [woman] to one man, and protecting his 
exclusive right by sanctions of morality and law. 
4. The better government of society, by distributing the community 
into separate families, and appointing over each the authority of a 
master of a family, which has more actual influence than all civil 
authority put together. 
5. The same end, in the additional security which the state receives 
for the good behaviour of its citizens, from the solicitude they feel for 
the welfare of their children, and from their being confined to 
permanent habitations. 
6. The encouragement of industry.468 
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Paley worked systematically through the respective “natural rights” and 
“duties” of husband and wife, and parent and child.469 In marriage, a husband 
promises “to love, comfort, honour, and keep, his wife,” and a wife promises 
“to obey, serve, love, honour, and keep, her husband; in every variety of 
health, fortune, and condition.”470 Both parties further stipulate “to forsake all 
others, and to keep only unto one another, so long as they both shall live.”471 In 
a word, said Paley, each spouse promises to do all that is necessary to “consult 
and promote each other’s happiness.”472 These are not only Scriptural and 
traditional duties of marriage. They are natural duties, as can be seen in the 
marital contracts of all manner of cultures, which Paley adduced in ample 
number.473 These natural duties, in turn, give the other spouse a natural right to 
enforce them in cases of adultery, “desertion, neglect, prodigality, 
drunkenness, peevishness, penuriousness, jealousy, or any levity of conduct 
which administers occasion of jealousy.”474 What St. Paul called the mutual 
“conjugal rights” of husband and wife are simply one way of formulating the 
natural rights that husband and wives enjoy the world over.475 
If the couple is blessed with children, the parents have a natural right and 
“duty” to provide for the child’s “maintenance, education, and a reasonable 
provision for the child’s happiness in respect of outward condition.”476 Parents’ 
rights to care for their children “result from their duties” to their children, said 
Paley.477 
If it be the duty of a parent to educate his children, to form them for a 
life of usefulness and virtue, to provide for them situations needful 
for their subsistence and suited to their circumstances, and to prepare 
them for those situations; he has a right to such authority, and in 
support of that authority to exercise such discipline as may be 
necessary for these purposes. The law of nature acknowledges no 
other foundation of a parent’s right over his children, besides his duty 
towards them. (I speak now of such rights as may be enforced by 
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coercion.) This relation confers no property in their persons, or 
natural dominion over them, as is commonly supposed.478 
But “[a] parent has, in no case, a right to destroy his child’s happiness,” 
Paley went on, and those that do will suffer punishment, if not lose custody of 
their child.479 Moreover, while parents have a right to encourage and train their 
children to a given vocation and to give their consent to their children’s 
marriages, “[p]arents have no right to urge their children upon marriages to 
which they are averse.”480 Children, in turn, have a natural right to receive the 
support, education, and care of their parents.481 They also have a natural duty 
to love, honor, and obey their parents even when they become adults, and to 
care for their parents when they become old, frail, and dependent.482 
Paley worked systematically through the various traditional sex crimes that 
deviated from these private and public goods of marriage, and the natural 
rights and duties of the household—now marshaling natural, rational, and 
utilitarian arguments against them.483 His arguments against incest, polygamy, 
and polygyny differed little from those of the other natural law theorists whom 
we have sampled. More original were his combinations of natural law and 
utilitarian arguments against fornication, prostitution, adultery, and easy 
divorce. 
Paley opposed fornication—sex or cohabitation without marriage—mostly 
because it “discourages marriage” and diminishes the private and public goods 
it offers “by abating the chief temptation to it. The male part of the species will 
not undertake the encumbrance, expense, and restraint of married life, if they 
can gratify their passions at a cheaper price; and they will undertake anything 
rather than not gratify them.”484 Paley recognized that he was appealing to 
general utility, but he thought an absolute ban on fornication was the only way 
to avoid the slippery slope to utter sexual libertinism.485 “The libertine may not 
be conscious that these irregularities hinder his own marriage, . . . much less 
does he perceive how his indulgences can hinder other men from marrying.”486 
“[B]ut,” Paley explained, “what will he say would be the consequence, if the 
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same licentiousness were universal? [O]r what should hinder its becoming 
universal, if it be innocent or allowable in him?”487 
Fornication furthermore leads to prostitution, Paley went on, with its 
accompanying degradation of women, erosion of morals, transmission of 
disease, production of unwanted and uncared for children, and further 
irregularities and pathos.488 Fornication also leads naturally to a tradition of 
concubinage—the “kept mistress[],” who can be dismissed at the man’s 
pleasure, or retained “in a state of humiliation and dependence inconsistent 
with the rights which marriage would confer upon her” and her children.489 No 
small wonder that the Bible condemned fornication, prostitution, concubinage, 
and other such “cohabitation without marriage” in no uncertain terms, said 
Paley, with ample demonstration.490 But, again, in these injunctions the Bible 
is simply reflecting the natural order and moral sense of mankind: 
Laying aside the injunctions of Scripture, the plain account of the 
question seems to be this: It is immoral, because it is pernicious, that 
men and women should cohabit, without undertaking certain 
irrevocable obligations, and mutually conferring certain civil rights; 
if, therefore, the law has annexed these rights and obligations to 
certain forms, so that they cannot be secured or undertaken by any 
other means, which is the case here (for, whatever the parties may 
promise to each other, nothing but the marriage-ceremony can make 
their promise irrevocable), it becomes in the same degree immoral, 
that men and women should cohabit without the interposition of these 
forms.491 
Adultery is even worse than fornication, said Paley, because it not only 
insults the goods of marriage in the abstract,492 it injures an actual marriage, 
leaving the innocent spouse as well as their children as victims.493 For the 
betrayed spouse, adultery is “a wound in his [or her] sensibility and affections, 
the most painful and incurable that human nature knows.”494 For the children it 
brings shame and unhappiness as the vice is inevitably detected and 
discussed.495 For the adulterer or adulteress, it is a form of “perjury” that 
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violates their marital vow and covenant.496 For all parties in the household, 
adultery will often provoke retaliation and imitation—another slippery slope to 
the erosion of marriage and the unleashing of sexual libertinism and 
seduction.497 Both nature and Scripture thus rain down anathemas against it.498 
Paley opposed frivolous or voluntary divorce as well, using arguments 
from the “law of nature” and “general utility.”499 Like many other Protestants, 
he thought that divorce and remarriage of the innocent spouse was both natural 
and necessary in cases of adultery, malicious desertion, habitual intemperance, 
cruelty, and serious crime—although he recognized that the “Scriptures seem 
to have drawn the obligation tighter than the law of nature left it,” and that 
separation from bed and board might be considered an option for some 
Christians who wish to live strictly in accordance with the Bible.500 But Paley 
was against voluntary divorces or separations for “inferior causes” or by 
“mutual consent,” grounding his opposition in arguments from nature and 
utility.501 Such “inferior,” or lighter, divorces were obviously against natural 
law if the couple had dependent children, Paley thought.502 
[I]t is manifestly inconsistent with the [natural] duty which the 
parents owe to their children; which duty can never be so well 
fulfilled as by their cohabitation and united care. It is also 
incompatible with the right which the mother possesses, as well as 
the father, to the gratitude of her children and the comfort of their 
society; of both which she is almost necessarily deprived, by her 
dismiss[al] from her husband’s family.503 
Unilateral divorces for lighter causes, or for no cause at all, are not so 
obviously against natural law for childless couples, Paley argued, but they are 
still “[in]expedient” enough to prohibit.504 The worry is, again, the mixed 
signaling of such a regime and the gradual slide down the slippery slope 
toward “libertinism.”505 If such easy divorces are available, especially on a 
unilateral basis, each spouse will be tempted to begin pursuing his or her own 
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separate interests rather than a common marital interest once the heat of their 
new love has begun to cool.506 Each will begin hoarding their own money, 
developing their own friendships, and living more and more independently 
from the other.507 “This would beget peculation on one side, and mistrust on 
the other; evils which at present very little disturb the confidence of married 
life” but eventually will destroy it from within.508 The availability of easy 
divorce will discourage spouses to reconcile their conflicts or “take pains to 
give up what offends, and [practice] what may gratify the other.”509 They will 
have less incentive to work hard to “make the best of their bargain” or 
“promot[e] the pleasure of the other.”510 
Limiting divorce to cases of serious fault will stop this inevitable 
downward spiral in a marriage, Paley believed.511 Forcing couples to stay 
together for better or worse, “though at first extorted by necessity, become in 
time easy and mutual; and, though less endearing than assiduities which take 
their rise from affection, generally procure to the married pair a repose and 
satisfaction sufficient for their happiness.”512 The availability of easy divorce, 
by contrast, will heighten the natural temptation of each spouse, especially the 
husband, to succumb to “new objects of desire.”513 However much in love they 
were with their wives on their wedding day, and however hard they try, men 
are naturally inclined to wander after “the invitations of novelty” unless they 
are permanently constrained to remain faithful to their wives even as their 
wives lose their youthful vigor and figure.514 Thus 
constituted as mankind are, and injured as the repudiated wife 
generally must be, it is necessary to add a stability to the condition of 
married women, more secure than the continuance of their husbands’ 
affection; and to supply to both sides, by a sense of duty and of 
obligation, what satiety has impaired of passion and of personal 
attachment. Upon the whole, the power of divorce is evidently and 
greatly to the disadvantage of the woman: and the only question 
appears to be, whether the real and permanent happiness of one half 
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of the species should be surrendered to the caprice and 
voluptuousness of the other?515 
Paley’s natural law and theological utilitarian arguments in favor of 
traditional understandings of sex, marriage, and family life would find 
enduring provenance among many utilitarians into the nineteenth century. The 
most famous of these utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), endorsed 
most of these same propositions that Paley had set forth, even though Bentham 
famously eschewed the natural law and natural rights language that had so 
inspired Paley’s theory of marriage.516 Bentham thought most traditional sex, 
marriage, and family norms could be rationalized on utilitarian principles 
alone.517 
VI. COMMON LAW FORMULATIONS OF THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Home, Hutcheson, Hume, and Paley led scores 
of other writers from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries who defended 
traditional Western norms of sex, marriage, and family using this surfeit of 
arguments from nature, reason, custom, fairness, prudence, utility, pragmatism, 
and common sense. Some of these natural law theorists were inspired, no 
doubt, by their personal Christian faith, others by a conservative desire to 
maintain the status quo. But most of these writers pressed their principal 
arguments on non-biblical grounds. And they were sometimes sharply critical 
of the Bible—denouncing St. Paul’s preferences for celibacy, the Mosaic 
provisions on unilateral male divorce, and the many tales of polygamy, 
concubinage, and prostitution among the ancient biblical patriarchs and kings. 
Moreover, most of these writers jettisoned many other features of the Western 
tradition that, in their judgment, defied reason, fairness, and utility—including, 
notably, the establishment of Christianity by law and the political privileging 
of the church over other associations. Their natural law theory of the family 
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was not just a rationalist apologia for traditional Christian family values or a 
naturalist smokescreen for personal religious beliefs. They defended traditional 
family norms not out of confessional faith but out of rational proof, not just 
because they uncritically believed in them but because they worked. 
It was precisely this rational, utilitarian, and even pragmatic defense of the 
natural configuration of marriage and family life that made it so appealing to 
modern English and American jurists as they sought to create a common law of 
marriage that no longer depended on ecclesiastical law, church courts, or 
theological arguments. Particularly in America, the disestablishment of 
religion mandated by the federal and state constitutions made direct appeals to 
the Bible and to Christian theology an insufficient ground by itself for cogent 
legal arguments concerning marriage.518 Even in England, which retained its 
Anglican establishment, many common lawyers were equally eager to cast 
their argument in the natural and utilitarian terms of the Enlightenment, rather 
than the biblical and theological terms of the tradition. It was one thing to say 
that “Christianity is part of the common law,” as Anglo-American lawyers had 
long said.519 It was quite another thing to say that the common law is part of 
Christianity. That would simply not do. The Enlightenment philosophical 
defense of sex, marriage, and family norms was thus attractive to the common 
lawyers. 
For example, William Blackstone (1723–1780), the leading English 
common lawyer of the eighteenth century, adverted regularly to these natural 
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law writings in his influential Commentaries on the Law of England.520 Citing 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Montesquieu, and others, Blackstone argued that exclusive 
and enduring monogamous marriages were the best way to ensure paternal 
certainty and joint parental investment in children who are born vulnerable and 
utterly dependent on their parents’ mutual care: 
Montesquieu has a very just observation upon this head: that the 
establishment of marriage in all civilized states is built on this natural 
obligation of the father to provide for his children; for that ascertains 
and makes known the person who is bound to fulfil this obligation: 
whereas, in promiscuous and illicit conjunctions, the father is 
unknown; and the mother finds a thousand obstacles in her way, 
shame, remorse, the constraint of her sex, and the rigour of laws, that 
stifle her inclinations to perform this duty; and, besides, she generally 
wants ability.521 
“[T]he duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a 
principle of natural law,” Blackstone continued.522 It is “an obligation, says 
Puffendorf [sic], laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own 
proper act, in bringing them into the world.”523 “The main end and design of 
marriage” he concluded, is “to ascertain and fix upon some certain person, to 
whom the care, the protection, the maintenance, and the education of the 
children should belong.”524 
Much like his fellow Englishmen, William Paley and John Locke, 
Blackstone set out in detail the reciprocal rights and duties that the natural law 
imposes upon parents and children.525 God and nature have “implant[ed] in the 
breast of every parent” an “insuperable degree of affection” for their child once 
they are certain the child is theirs, Blackstone wrote.526 The common law 
confirms and channels this natural affection by requiring parents to maintain, 
protect, and educate their children, and by protecting their rights to discharge 
these parental duties against undue interference by others.527 These “natural 
dut[ies]” of parents are the correlatives of the natural rights of their children 
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Blackstone further argued, quoting Grotius.528 Once they become adults, 
children acquire reciprocal natural duties toward their parents: 
The duties of children to their parents arise from a principle of natural 
justice and retribution. For to those who gave us existence we 
naturally owe subjection and obedience during our minority, and 
honour and reverence ever after: they who protected the weakness of 
our infancy are entitled to our protection in the infirmity of their age; 
they who by sustenance and education have enabled their offspring to 
prosper, ought in return to be supported by that offspring, in case they 
stand in need of assistance. Upon this principle proceed all the duties 
of children to their parents which are enjoined by positive laws.529 
While Blackstone’s views had an enduring influence on the English 
common law of marriage, the formulations of United States Supreme Court 
Justice Joseph Story (1779–1845) were foundational for American law.530 Like 
Blackstone, Story was a student of European natural law theories of marriage, 
and he drew heavily on Scottish, English, and continental European 
Enlightenment writers in formulating his views.531 Story was also a deep 
student of comparative legal history and conflict of laws, and he studded his 
writings with all manner of ancient, medieval, and early modern sources on the 
origin, nature, and purpose of marriage. 
Marriage is treated by all civilized nations as a peculiar and favored 
contract. It is in its origin a contract of natural law. . . . It is the 
parent, and not the child of society; principium urbis et quasi 
seminarium reipublicae [the source of the city, a sort of seminary of 
the republic]. In civil society it becomes a civil contract, regulated 
and prescribed by law, and endowed with civil consequences. In most 
civilized countries, acting under a sense of the force of sacred 
obligations, it has had the sanctions of religion superadded. It then 
becomes a religious, as well as a natural and civil contract; for it is a 
great mistake to suppose, that because it is the one, therefore it may 
not likewise be the other.532 
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Marriage is thus a civil contract dependent in its essence on the mutual 
consent of a man and a woman with the freedom and capacity to marry each 
other. But marriage is more than “a mere contract,” Story insisted, for it also 
has natural, religious, and social dimensions, all of which the positive law of 
the state must take into account.533 The state’s positive law of marriage must 
reflect the natural law teaching that marriage is a monogamous union 
presumptively for life; that marriage channels the strong human sex drive 
toward marital sex which serves to deepen the mutual love between husband 
and wife; and that marriage provides a stable and lifelong system of support, 
protection, and edification for husbands and wives, and parents and children.534 
The positive law of the state must also reflect the teachings of nature—
sometimes alone and sometimes with “religion superadded”—that civilized 
societies outlaw the practices of polygamy, incest, fornication, adultery, and 
light divorce that all violate the other spouse’s natural rights, as well as the acts 
of desertion, abuse, neglect, and disinheritance that violate their children’s 
natural rights.535 “A heathen nation might justify polygamy, or incest, contracts 
of moral turpitude, or exercises of despotic cruelty over persons, which would 
be repugnant to the first principles of Christian duty.”536 But not so here, Story 
insisted. Normally, America will honor a contract made in a foreign country on 
the traditional conflict of laws principle that “if [it is] valid there, it is valid 
every where.”537 But “[t]he most prominent, if not the only known exceptions 
to this rule, are those respecting polygamy and incest,” since they are 
“repugnant to” the public policy of a civilized nation.538 
It is just because marriage has all of these natural goods and qualities 
embedded within it that it is more than “mere contract,” Story went on.539 
While all fit adults have the natural right and liberty to enter into a valid 
marriage contract, the form, function, and limits of this marriage contract are 
not subject to private bargain but preset by nature and society.540 In almost all 
civilizations and legal systems, “marriage is a contract sui generis, and 
differing . . . from all other contracts”—indeed, a unique form of covenant.541 
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Story quoted at length from a Scottish case that distilled the views of Home, 
Hutcheson, Hume, and others: 
The contract of marriage is the most important of all human 
transactions. It is the very basis of the whole fabric of civilized 
society. The status of marriage is juris gentium [part of the common 
law of nations], and the foundation of it, like that of all other 
contracts, rests on the consent of parties. But it differs from other 
contracts in this, that the rights, obligations, or duties, arising from it, 
are not left entirely to be regulated by the agreements of parties, but 
are, to a certain extent, matters of municipal regulation, over which 
the parties have no control, by any declaration of their will. It confers 
the status of legitimacy on children born in wedlock, with all the 
consequential rights, duties, and privileges, thence arising; it gives 
rise to the relations of consanguinity and affinity; in short, it pervades 
the whole system of civil society. Unlike other contracts, it cannot, in 
general, amongst civilized nations, be dissolved by mutual consent; 
and it subsists in full force, even although one of the parties should be 
for ever rendered incapable, as in the case of incurable insanity, or 
the like, from performing his part of the mutual contract. 
No wonder that the rights, duties, and obligations, arising from 
so important a contract, should not be left to the discretion or caprice 
of the contracting parties, but should be regulated, in many important 
particulars, by the laws of every civilized country. . . . [M]any of the 
rights, duties, and obligations, arising from it, are so important to the 
best interests of morality and good government, that the parties have 
no control over them; but they are regulated and enforced by the 
public law . . . .542 
This was a common argument among Anglo-American common lawyers in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Not only did they draw on the 
same Scottish, English, and continental European writers to defend the natural 
law configuration of marriage and the natural law prohibition on various sex 
crimes. They also, like Story, treated marriage as a multidimensional 
institution that discharged multiple goods for husbands and wives, parents and 
children, and society and the state alike. 
Chancellor James Kent (1763–1847) of New York, for example, one of the 
great early systematizers of American law alongside Story, lifted up the civil, 
natural, and religious dimensions of marriage in his 1826 Commentaries on 
American Law: 
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The primary and most important of the domestic relations, is that of 
husband and wife. It has its foundation in nature, and is the only 
lawful relation by which Providence has permitted the continuance of 
the human race. In every age it has [had] a propitious influence on the 
moral improvement and happiness of mankind. It is one of the chief 
foundations of social order. We may justly place to the credit of the 
institution of marriage, a great share of the blessings which flow from 
refinement of manners, the education of children, the sense of justice, 
and the cultivation of the liberal arts.543 
Citing Pufendorf, Paley, and various Scottish writers, Kent then worked 
systematically and at some length through their by now familiar arguments for 
exclusive and enduring monogamous marriage and family life, and against 
incest, polygamy, extramarital sex, and easy divorce.544 
A couple of generations later, Leonard Shelford (1795–1864), an English 
common law authority often used in America, combined the early modern 
natural theories of marriage of his day with those of the classical Roman 
lawyers.545 Shelford started with the Stoic formulation of Modestinus that 
marriage is “the union of a man and a woman, a partnership for life involving 
divine as well as human law.”546 The Romans were largely content to make 
such categorical statements about marriage, Shelford pointed out, without 
theoretically elaborating them.547 But the Western tradition has, since Roman 
times, come to understand that monogamous, lifelong marriages are naturally 
designed to foster the good of the couple and their children, the church and the 
state, and the society and its morals at once.548 After quoting several English 
and Scottish authorities, Shelford wrote: 
From various learned authors it may be inferred that marriage is, 
according to the primitive law of God and Nature, for the mutual help 
of husband and wife—the propagation of the human race—the 
educating and instructing of their children in the fear and love of 
God, and training them to be useful members of society. It is a 
solemn contract, whereby a man and a woman, for their mutual 
benefit, and the procreation of children, engage to live in a kind and 
affectionate manner . . . . Besides the procreation and education of 
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children, marriage has for its object the mutual society, help, and 
comfort that the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and 
adversity. Marriage is the most solemn engagement which one human 
being can contract with another. It is a contract formed with a view 
not only to the benefit of the parties themselves, but to the benefit of 
third parties; to the benefit of their common offspring, and to the 
moral order of civil society.549 
All this is “confirmed and enforced by the Holy Scriptures,” Shelford 
added, citing the famous passages in Genesis 2, Matthew 19, and 
Ephesians 5.550 But the state is not heavily involved in the regulation of 
marriage because it wants to establish biblical truths, Shelford continued, but 
rather to preserve the public and private goods of marriage.551 
“[N]otwithstanding the origin and divine institution of marriage, human 
legislatures have very properly assumed the power of regulating the exercise of 
the right of marriage, on account of its leading to relations, duties, and 
consequences, materially affecting the welfare and peace of society.” Because 
of this, “[i]t has been the policy of legislatures, proceeding on the ground that 
marriage is the origin of all relations, and consequently the first element of all 
social duties, to preserve the sacred nature of this contract.”552 
A couple of generations later, distinguished American jurist W.C. Rodgers 
opened his oft-reprinted treatise on the law of domestic relations with a 
veritable homily on marriage that made use of arguments based both on nature 
and what he called the “Divine plan.”553 Notice the ease with which he sets out 
the basic argument for the natural configuration of marriage and family life: 
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In a sense, it is a consummation of the Divine command to “multiply 
and replenish the earth.” It is the state of existence ordained by the 
Creator, who has fashioned man and woman expressly for the society 
and enjoyment incident to mutual companionship. This Divine plan is 
supported and prompted by the natural instinct, as it were, on the part 
of both for the society of each other. It is the highest state of 
existence in the most polished condition of man. All living creatures 
are made male and female; but it is for man only to live in a state of 
matrimony, and for him alone to guard and perpetuate marriage as 
practiced and sanctioned by all civilized people from the earliest 
times. The lower animals know nothing of the state, and it only exists 
imperfectly in savage life. All writers . . . proclaim it the only stable 
substructure of our social, civil and religious institutions. Religion, 
government, morals, progress, enlightened learning and domestic 
happiness must all fall into most certain and inevitable decay when 
the married state ceases to be recognized or respected. Accordingly, 
we have in this state of man and woman the most essential foundation 
of religion, social purity and domestic happiness.554 
This thick multidimensional understanding of marriage informed many 
judicial opinions of the nineteenth century as well. Marriage law treatises at the 
turn of the twentieth century devoted many pages to citations to and quotations 
from state and lower federal cases that made the same point that marriage, 
while rooted in contract, was a multidimensional institution that served public 
and private goods at once. Such views occasionally reached the United States 
Supreme Court, too, which spoke repeatedly of marriage as “more than a 
[mere] contract”555 and “a sacred obligation.”556 In Murphy v. Ramsey, for 
example, one of a series of Supreme Court cases upholding anti-polygamy 
laws against Mormon religious freedom arguments, Justice Matthews declared 
for the Court: 
For certainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and 
necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing 
commonwealth . . . than that which seeks to establish it on the basis 
of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the 
union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of 
matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our 
civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent morality which is the 
 
 554 Id.  
 555 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888). 
 556 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878); see 
also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (referring to marriage as a “holy estate”). 
WITTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2015 12:28 PM 
666 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:591 
source of all beneficent progress in social and political 
improvement.557 
The Court argued similarly in Maynard v. Hill, a case upholding a new 
state law on divorce and holding that marriage is not a “contract” for purposes 
of interpreting the prohibition in Article I, Section 10 of the United States 
Constitution: “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.”558 After rehearsing at length various authorities of the day, Justice 
Field declared for the Court: 
[W]hilst marriage is often termed . . . a civil contract—generally to 
indicate that it must be founded upon the agreement of the parties, 
and does not require any religious ceremony for its solemnization—it 
is something more than a mere contract. The consent of the parties is 
of course essential to its existence, but when the contract to marry is 
executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is created 
which they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified, 
restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the 
parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps 
in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. It is an 
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is 
deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, 
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.559 
Following Protestant conventions of the day, Anglo-American jurists and 
judges in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries frequently used the term 
“covenant” to distill this common notion that marriage is a contract, but 
something more than “a mere contract.”560 Cases and treatises of the day 
regularly spoke of “the marriage covenant,” “the covenant of marriage,” the 
covenantal “duties” of marriage, “the most solemn and binding character” of a 
marriage covenant, the “sanction,” “natural relationship,” “natural union,” and 
“indissoluble bond of the marriage” covenant.561 Such terminology 
 
 557 114 U.S. at 45. 
 558 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 559 125 U.S. at 210–11. 
 560 See, e.g., THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, ESSAY ON DIVORCE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION 96, 196–97, 217, 
235, 256 (New York, Charles Scribner & Co. 1869). 
 561 See Morehouse v. Morehouse, 39 A. 516, 519 (Conn. 1898); Woodward v. Shaw, 18 Me. 304, 308 
(1841); Little v. Gibson, 39 N.H. 505 (1859); Hickle v. Hickle, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 552 (1892); H. HENSLEY 
HENSON, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 12, 51, 59 (1910); JOHN WILLIAMS MORRIS, OBSERVATIONS ON THE 
MARRIAGE LAWS 150, 159–63, 194, 277, 320, 338 (London, J. Hatchard 1815); EDWIN H. WOODRUFF, A 
SELECTION OF CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND THE LAW OF PERSONS 240 (1905). 
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underscored that the marital agreement had special qualities that went beyond 
the mutual consent and mutual promises of the couple. 
In the nineteenth century, Anglo-American common lawyers also came to 
use the term “status” as something of a synonym for the term “covenant.”562 
“Status” was a term that English legal historian Sir Henry Sumner Maine 
(1822–1888) had made famous in his provocative theory that the law of 
Victorian England altogether was moving “from Status to Contract.”563 Many 
American jurists accepted the concept of marriage as a “status,” without 
buying Maine’s broader argument that marriage law was moving from “status 
to contract.”564 Perhaps that movement could be seen in other areas of law 
where private contract was on the rise, American jurists argued, but the 
opposite was true in the law of marriage. 
Joel Bishop (1814–1901), a leading American family law jurist, put it thus:  
[Marriage is] a civil status, existing in one man and one woman, 
legally united for life, for those civil and social purposes which are 
founded in the distinction of sex. Its source is the law of nature, 
whence it has flowed into the municipal laws of every laws of every 
civilized country, and into the general law of nations. . . . [M]arriage 
may be said to proceed from a civil contract between one man and 
one woman, of the needful physical and civil capacity. While the 
contract remains executory, that is, an agreement to marry, it differs 
in no essential particulars from other civil contracts . . . . But when it 
becomes executed in what the law recognizes as a valid marriage, its 
nature as a contract is merged in the higher nature of the status.565 
The state law of matrimony, Bishop continued, fixes the terms of the marriage 
contract in accordance with the dictates of nature, morality, and society.566 
Parties are free to accept or reject these basic terms, but they cannot rescind, 
condition, or modify them if they wish to enter a valid marriage.567 And, once 
they marry, their status of being married is presumptively permanent and 
 
 562 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 164–65 (Henry Holt & Co. 4th ed. 1906) (1861). 
 563 Id. at 165. 
 564 For studies of Maine’s variant influence on Anglo-American legal and political thought, see R.C.J. 
COCKS, SIR HENRY MAINE: A STUDY IN VICTORIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1988); PAUL VINOGRADOFF, THE 
TEACHING OF SIR HENRY MAINE (1904); and Mark Francis, H.S. Maine: Victorian Evolution and Political 
Theory, 19 HIST. EUR. IDEAS 753 (1994). 
 565 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN 
MATRIMONIAL SUITS 25 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 2d ed. 1856). 
 566 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN 
MATRIMONIAL SUITS 27–28 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1852). 
 567 Id. 
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exclusive and carries with it built-in obligations of support and care for spouse, 
child, and other loved ones that continue even after death.568 Marital parties 
cannot dissolve this union on their own ipse dixit, nor simply walk away from 
their obligations with impunity.569 The voluntarily assumed legal status of 
being a husband, wife, father, or mother is something that stays with them, 
even if they separate or divorce.570 The law still expects them to support and 
cooperate with each other in the care of their children and sometimes to 
support each other through payment of alimony.571 And, even after death, the 
marital status of the decedent creates testamentary presumptions in favor of the 
surviving spouse, children, and natural kin.572 
American jurist, James Schouler (1839–1920), put it succinctly in his 
authoritative 1921 treatise on domestic relations: 
This [marital] contract of the parties is simply to enter into a certain 
status or relation. The rights and obligations of that status are fixed 
by society in accordance with principles of natural law, and are 
beyond and above the parties themselves. They may make 
settlements and regulate the property rights of each other; but they 
cannot modify the terms upon which they are to live together, nor 
superadd to the relation a single condition. Being once bound they are 
bound forever. Mutual consent, as in all contracts, brings them 
together; but mutual consent cannot part them.573 
By the early twentieth century, this idea that marriage was a special civil 
status, defined by law, but entered into by voluntary contract, became the 
preferred common law formula.574 Jurists and judges of the day used the term 
“marriage as status” as a short-hand formula to signify several features of 
marriage at once: (1) that marriage was a multidimensional institution, at once 
a contractual, natural, social, moral, economic, and religious in origin and 
orientation; (2) that marriage was both a private institution rooted in the 
consent of the parties, and a public institution directed to the goods of the 
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couple, their children, and the broader communities of which they were a part; 
(3) that marriage was predetermined in its form, permanent in its obligations, 
and preclusive of any other sexual or marital relation; and (4) that marriage 
defined a person’s status and standing in society, and vested them with the 
special rights and duties that became that status.575 
“The doctrine that marriage is a status is modern,” wrote the distinguished 
American jurist William Nelson in 1895.576 By calling marriage a “status,” the 
American common law had settled on a halfway step between the traditional 
notion that “marriage was a sacrament to be solemnized by a religious 
ceremony of the church regardless of the faith of the parties” and the modern 
notion that marriage was merely a private “civil contract” in which the public 
has no interest.577 Marriage was a contract, but it was also more than a 
contract, Nelson insisted.578 Marriage was not a sacrament, but it did embrace 
some of the same qualities of faithfulness, exclusivity, and permanence that 
typified sacramental and covenantal marriages since the time of Augustine.579 
Religious communities could add requirements to the “civil status” of 
marriage for their own voluntary faithful to abide, Nelson and others 
continued, but not subtract from them. They could, for example, prohibit 
interreligious marriages or divorce and remarriage, as Catholics do. They could 
insist on various forms of premarital preparation and liturgical celebration, as 
some Protestants do. They could even insist on detailed prenuptial contracts 
about property and inheritance, as some Jews do. But all these enhancements 
have to be consistent with the core forms and norms of marriage prescribed by 
state law and rooted in common human nature and natural law. Religious 
communities have no right, for example, to permit polygamy among their 
members, as Mormons and Muslims sometimes do. They have no business 
forcing couples to marry sight unseen, as some Indian Hindus and Native 
American Indians do. Nor do they have the right to endanger the health and 
 
 575 See TIFFANY, supra note 574, at 4–7. For modern expositions on the continued importance of status in 
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WITTE GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2015 12:28 PM 
670 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:591 
happiness of their children through hard labor, severe corporal discipline, faith 
healing, or comparable intrusions on the natural rights of the child. Religious 
communities can add to natural and positive laws governing the core civil 
status of marriage and family life. But they may not subtract or detract from 
them, even in the name of religious freedom.580 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The story of this Article will surprise some readers. Some will be surprised 
that pre-Enlightenment Christian writers developed elaborate natural law and 
natural rights theories of sex, marriage, and family life, independently of the 
Bible, and sometimes in sharp critique of particular biblical teachings and 
practices. The common assumption is that Christian theories of marriage and 
family life were spiritual through and through and thus happily dispensable in 
our post-modern, post-establishment of religion era. Some will be surprised 
that several of the famous philosophers associated with the Western 
Enlightenment embraced traditional Christian teachings about sex, marriage, 
and family, and then worked hard to prove and improve this inheritance with 
elaborate arguments from nature, reason, custom, fairness, and utility. The 
common assumption is that the Western Enlightenment had denounced the 
Western Christian tradition for privileging church over state, Scripture over 
reason, men over women, chastity over sex, procreation über alles. And some 
readers will be surprised that the Anglo-American common lawyers of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries drew directly on this rich natural law 
theory in devising the idea of marriage as a valuable status that deserves to be 
privileged and in denouncing incest, polygamy, adultery, fornication, and easy 
divorce as dangerous deviations from natural and social order. The common 
assumption is that Anglo-American lawyers by this time were legal positivists 
who had no room for such speculative natural law inquiries; hadn’t Oliver 
Wendell Holmes finally and fully dismissed natural law as a “brooding 
omnipresence in the sky” with no earthly value or legal validity?581 
The reality, however, is that from roughly 1600 to 1900, the Western legal 
tradition—and in particular the Anglo-American common law tradition that 
has been our focus—embraced and enhanced the natural law configuration of 
marriage and family life that had been adumbrated by Aristotle, elaborated by 
 
 580 See CHARLES CAVERNO, TREATISE ON DIVORCE 22–24 (Madison, Midland Publ’g Co. 1889); see also 
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 581 See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Vitoria, and then appropriated and expanded 
by Enlightenment liberals and jurists. The heart of the argument is that 
exclusive and enduring monogamous marriages are the best way to ensure 
paternal certainty and essential joint parental investment in fragile and 
dependent children. If men and women could have random sex with anyone, 
men would not only exploit women mercilessly to gratify their sexual drives 
but they would also ignore their children since they would have no certainty of 
their paternity. If men did not invest in the care of their children, many of those 
children would suffer or die, particularly as infants, when their mothers were 
weakened from childbirth and lack of sleep and least capable of caring for all 
her children and herself as well. Thus, the natural law inclines the human 
species to center their sexual and procreative activities within the marital 
household. It further inclines a mother to bond deeply with her child during 
pregnancy and nursing, and to nourish and protect the child until it has grown. 
And it inclines a father to bond with a child that he knows is his own, that 
looks like him, that is an extension and creation of his being, substance, or 
genes, and that can carry on his name, work, property, and legacy. 
The natural law tradition presupposed that husbands and wives had to work 
hard to maintain active and healthy sex lives—even when, indeed especially 
when, procreation was not or was no longer possible. Robust sexual 
communication within marriage is essential for couples to deepen their marital 
love and to remain in their own marital beds, rather than testing their 
neighbor’s. And marital sex sometimes is even more important when the 
marital home is (newly) empty and husbands and wives depend more centrally 
on each other (not on their children) for emotional confirmation and 
fulfillment. Not every sexual act within the marital bed needs to be procreative, 
the tradition taught. Sexual intimacy between married couples is an essential 
good in its own right, regardless of procreative intent, capacity, or result. The 
rigid procreative perfectionism and narrow reduction of sexual intimacy to 
intercourse alone, featured in some modern Christian theories of natural law, 
do not reflect the many traditional natural law teachings that marital sex is a 
good, gift, and blessing in its own right. 
This natural law tradition emphasized that parents and children have 
reciprocal natural rights and natural duties vis-à-vis each other. Rather than 
simply pretending that children can thrive equally well with wet nurses and 
orphanages, with random bottle-holders and community care-takers, the 
natural law tradition emphasized the vital organic bonds between mother, 
father, and child. It stipulated that the man and woman who produce a child 
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should have the prima facie right and duty to care for that child. And it 
emphasized that children have the correlative right to be raised, if possible, by 
the parents who procreate them—or in some cases, those who adopt them. This 
teaching about the rights and duties of parents and children is not only a 
feature of classical, Christian, and Enlightenment natural law theories, but it 
has been reasserted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many of 
its successor documents, including the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.582 
The natural law tradition also emphasized that exclusive and enduring 
monogamous marriages are the best way to ensure that men and women are 
treated with the equal dignity and respect, and that husbands and wives, and 
parents and children, provide each other with mutual support and protection 
throughout their lifetimes. If husbands can just walk away from their wives 
once they have produced children, if wives can just walk away from their 
husbands if they become injured or impotent, if children can just abandon their 
families once they have been emancipated, or if parents can just ignore their 
emancipated children even when they have great need, too many parties are 
left vulnerable and dependent on the charity of others. The natural law thus 
inclines humans to remain bonded to their marriages and families, and to care 
for their natural kin throughout their lives, even at ample personal sacrifice. 
Finally, the natural law tradition discouraged many other types of sexual 
activities and interactions that jeopardized the stability and support of the 
marital household. Polygamy was out because it fractures marital trust and 
troth, harms wives and children, privileges patriarchy and sexual slavery, and 
foments male lust and adultery. Polyandry was out because it creates paternal 
uncertainty and catalyzes male rivalry to the ultimate detriment of the children. 
Incest was out because it overrides the instincts of natural revulsion, it weakens 
bloodlines, and it deters the creation of new kinship networks. Prostitution and 
fornication were out because they often exploit women, foster libertinism, 
deter marriage, and produce dependent bastards. Adultery was out for some of 
the same reasons, but even more because it shatters marital fidelity and trust, 
diffuses family resources and parental energy, and risks sexual disease and 
physical retaliation of the betrayed spouse. Easy divorce was out because it 
erodes marital fidelity and investment, jeopardizes long-term spousal support 
and care, and squanders family property on which children eventually depend 
 
 582 See John Witte, Jr. & Don S. Browning, Christianity’s Mixed Contributions to Children’s Rights: 
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to care for their elderly parents. By the turn of the twentieth century, similar 
natural law and natural rights arguments were being used to begin to stamp out 
the discrimination that the common law still retained against spinsters, wives, 
and illegitimate children. 
Even the most robust natural law theorists, however, whether traditional 
Christians or post-Christian Enlightenment liberals, understood that the natural 
law of sex, marriage, and family could not do it all. For the natural law is not 
and cannot be self-executing. The natural law might well incline humans to 
behave in certain ways in their sex, marriage, and family lives, and many 
humans in fact generally follow these inclinations without much further 
prompting. But given our human natures—and the Jekylls and Hydes that 
perilously vie within each of us—natural inclinations, by themselves, are pretty 
wobbly, and can produce only a shaky normative framework. The reality is 
that a good number of folks stray on occasion from what might be considered 
to be the naturally licit and socially expedient sexual path for the human 
species. And some folks stray all the time, harming themselves and many 
others along the way. The natural law thus also needs the positive law of the 
state for stability—to teach these basic norms of sex, marriage, and family life 
to the community, to encourage and facilitate citizens to live in accordance 
with them, to nudge and incentivize sexual and marital behavior that caters to 
private and public goods, and to redirect and rehabilitate those citizens who 
wander too far. The nineteenth-century American common law notion of 
marriage and the household as a good and desirable “status” that the state 
should support captures this insight that natural law and positive law must 
work together to create fair and stable sex, marriage, and family lives for 
citizens. 
Natural law not only needs the positive laws of the state to teach and 
enforce its norms on sex, marriage, and family life. It also needs broader 
communities and narratives to stabilize, deepen, and improve these norms. It 
depends on deeper models and exemplars of love and faithfulness, trust and 
sacrifice, commitment and community to give its teachings content and 
coherence. It depends on other stable institutions besides the state (churches, 
synagogues, schools, charities, hospitals, neighborhoods, and others) and other 
stable professionals besides lawyers (preachers, teachers, doctors, mentors, 
counselors, therapists, and others). The marital household is a 
multidimensional institution, and it depends upon multiple value systems and 
multiple institutions to be fully stable and functional. 
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Historically, pre-Christian Greeks and Romans, Catholic and Protestant 
theologians and jurists, and post-Christian liberal philosophers and common 
lawyers alike supported this integrated framework of sex, marriage, and family 
life, all drawing in part on common arguments about human nature, natural 
law, and natural rights. Enlightenment liberals, in particular—for all their 
post-Christian, and sometimes anti-Christian zeal—supported the traditional 
marital family as the most natural, expedient, and desirable form and forum of 
domestic life. Enlightenment liberals warned against the dangers of condoning 
“sexual libertinism” and allowing society to slide into a sexual state of nature 
without much law. They warned against the destruction of the marital 
household, for that would spell the “doom of all mortals.”583 But what both 
liberals and traditionalists long tried to integrate, modern society has 
increasingly come to separate. In the past two generations, the West has seen 
ever greater separations between marriage and sex; between marriage and 
childbirth; between marriage and child rearing; between childbirth and 
parenting; between sex and physical contact (with the advent of the virtual 
world); and between childbirth, sexual intercourse, and biological filiation 
(with the introduction of IVF technology, surrogacy, and sperm banks).584 
I stand firmly in support of modern liberty and deplore much of the 
patriarchy, paternalism, and plain prudishness of the past. I stand firmly in 
support of modern equality and applaud the great advances made of late on 
behalf of the rights of women, children, gays and lesbians, and many others 
who long faced chronic discrimination, deprivation, and exploitation. But I 
also stand firmly in support of the traditional marital household as a natural 
and necessary institution for the cultivation and preservation of the very 
ordered liberty and social stability that seems to be eroding today. And I 
believe that the natural law configuration of sex, marriage, and family life still 
provides enduring wisdom and instruction for a post-Christian and postmodern 
Western culture that remains dedicated to the liberty and equality of its 
citizens. 
Even if we now reject “natural law” today as old-fashioned, statist, 
essentialist, artificial, or out of touch with evolutionary or political realities, the 
basic facts of human nature and human sexuality have not changed. We 
humans still have perennial sex drives, especially when we are younger and 
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more fertile. We are still social creatures who crave stable intimate 
relationships over time. We still produce fragile babies who remain deeply 
dependent on their parents and other adults for a very long time. We still find 
that most women bond with children much more readily than do men—unless 
they know they are the fathers. 
To be sure, some of the scientific assumptions at work in traditional natural 
law teachings about the marital household have changed. Genetic testing has 
made paternity easier to establish. Contraceptives have made extramarital sex 
safer to pursue. And artificial reproductive technology has made single 
reproduction a greater possibility. But these scientific advances are by no 
means universally available, nor are they foolproof when available. And while 
they can enhance the sexual experiences and activities of humans, these 
scientific advances do not alter the core logic at work in the natural law 
configuration of marriage. Confining sex to marriage was important in earlier 
times to ensure paternal certainty, but the point of having paternal certainty 
was to ensure that a man could and would invest in the care of his child and its 
mother, ideally in a stable marital household. Using contraceptives certainly 
widens the opportunities for safe and secret extramarital sex, but it does not 
meet the traditional concern that rampant promiscuity often leads to sexual 
exploitation of women and unhealthy sexual libertinism among men. Having 
artificial reproductive technology (ART) available certainly enhances the 
chances of having a child on one’s own or with one’s spouse, but when a 
mother has drawn from an anonymous sperm bank or a frozen embryo 
collection, her child’s long-term concerns for its origin and identity remain 
unmet. There are many valuable uses for paternity tests, contraceptives, and 
ART in modern society, notably among married couples whose lives can be 
greatly enhanced by them. But these modern scientific advances do not, in my 
view, undercut the core logic of the natural configuration of marriage. 
Also, to be sure, the modern welfare state now supplies nonmarital 
children, single mothers, abandoned spouses, and aged parents with vast new 
resources traditionally supplied principally by their own natural kin and natural 
family networks. These, too, are valuable advances that promote social justice 
and greater happiness for all. But the availability of social welfare relief does 
not cancel the ongoing value of stable marital households and natural family 
networks. The modern welfare state remains an expensive and risky modern 
experiment: it’s less than a century old, and it’s not clear that this is a 
sustainable long term solution even for the affluent West, let alone for 
underdeveloped or developing countries. Moreover, even in America today, 
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while state funding is still amply at hand, those who depend exclusively on 
social welfare, Medicare, social security, and other entitlements often face 
bitter financial and emotional hardship, and endless bureaucratic wrangling as 
they seek to secure basic food, health care, and job stability. Better social 
welfare systems are in place in Europe today. But these, too, depend on high 
median wealth in the population, all of which can disappear quickly, as we just 
saw during the Great Recession and our (grand)parents saw in the Great 
Depression. The modern social welfare state should be seen as a supplement 
to, not a substitute for, the intergenerational care and nurture provided by 
stable families and natural kin structures. 
The real challenge today is to find ways of harmonizing the wisdom of the 
classical, Christian, and liberal traditions with the realities, conditions, and 
needs of the postmodern family. We cannot wax nostalgic about a prior golden 
age of marriage and the family, nor can we wax myopic about modern ideals of 
liberty, privacy, and autonomy. We cannot be blind to the patriarchy, 
paternalism, and plain prudishness of the past, nor can we be blind to the 
massive social, psychological, and spiritual costs of the modern sexual 
revolution. Participants in the conversation on marriage must seek to 
understand both traditional morals and contemporary mores on their own terms 
and in their own context—without deprecating or privileging either form or 
norm. Traditionalists must heed the maxim of Jaroslav Pelikan that “[t]radition 
is the living faith of the dead; traditionalism is the dead faith of the living.”585 
Wooden antiquarianism, a dogmatic indifference to the changing needs of 
marriages and families, is not apt. Modernists must heed the instruction of 
Harold Berman that “we must walk into the future with an eye on the past.”586 
Chronological snobbery, a calculated disregard for the wisdom of the past, also 
is not apt. I have tried to retrieve some of this past wisdom in this Article. In 
later articles and books, I hope to reconstruct this wisdom in a way that is 
useful for the law and culture of the twenty-first century family. 
 
 
 585 JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 65 (1984). 
 586 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION, at v, 
vii (1983). 
